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The U.S. Supreme Court held in New Jersey v. T.L.O. that school officials 
could search students without a warrant and with only reasonable suspicion, 
not probable cause, because of schools’ need for discipline and the 
relationship between educators and students.  That case belongs to a body of 
Fourth Amendment cases involving, in T.L.O.’s terms, “special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”  What Fourth Amendment 
standard, then, governs searches involving one of the roughly 20,000 school 
resource officers (SROs) in American schools?  Most state courts to decide 
the issue in the 1990s and 2000s found that T.L.O. applied to SRO-involved 
searches, likening SROs to school officials and drawing a line between SROs 
and other police officers. 
Reforms largely enacted in the 2010s, in contrast, draw a line between 
school officials and SROs, emphasizing that SROs are law enforcement 
officers, not school disciplinarians.  Reflecting the consensus that law 
enforcement responses to school misbehavior harm children, these reforms 
limit SRO involvement to more serious crimes or immediate safety risks. 
This Article is the first to explore how these recent reforms undermine 
earlier cases applying T.L.O. to SROs.  These recent reforms place SROs on 
the law enforcement side of the “special needs” line.  This analysis also 
shows how searches conducted under policies requiring schools to turn over 
evidence of criminal activity to law enforcement transform the character of 
searches conducted by school officials into law enforcement searches.  
Finally, this Article offers a doctrinal path to limiting warrantless school 
searches to narrower circumstances, thus letting authorities respond to the 
risk of deadly weapons at schools while limiting the risk that reduced Fourth 
Amendment protections will contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline. 
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INTRODUCTION 
School resource officers (SROs)1 are now a regular feature in American 
public schools.  After growing substantially in the 1990s and early 2000s in 
response to the early-1990s peak crime rate and mass shootings at schools, 
there are now roughly 20,000 sworn police officers stationed at schools.2  At 
the same time, policies that toughened school disciplinary and law 
enforcement consequences for school rule and criminal law violations took 
effect, causing what became known as the school-to-prison pipeline.  SROs’ 
presence was an important part of this story.  SROs became involved in 
school misbehavior—such as fights and disobedience—that school officials 
would have handled in prior generations, and SROs increasingly arrested and 
charged students for such incidents.3  SROs also became involved in searches 
of students for evidence of crimes—both by searching students directly and 
through policies requiring school officials to turn over the fruits of their 
searches to SROs.  In the past, a student found to have stolen money from 
another student or with a joint in his pocket could have been subject to school 
discipline—say, detention or suspension, with a requirement to return stolen 
items or participate in substance-abuse counseling—but now also faces 
arrest. 
SRO involvement in searches raises difficult questions under the Fourth 
Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O.4 in 
1985—before the sharp increase in SRO presence in schools—and held that 
primary and secondary school officials could search students without a 
warrant and with only reasonable suspicion of a school rule or criminal law 
violation.5  The Court emphasized schools’ need for discipline and the 
relationship between educators and students in crafting this exception to 
normal Fourth Amendment rules, and it explicitly avoided any decisions 
regarding school searches conducted by officers or by school officials “in 
 
 1. Local jurisdictions use a range of alternative terminology for police officers assigned 
to schools, including “school liaison officer” and “school board officer.” See, e.g., People v. 
Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 313 (Ill. 1996) (using the term “liaison officer”).  This Article uses 
the term “school resource officer” and its acronym because it is the most common term and 
for ease of reference.  This Article uses that term even when cited authorities use alternative 
terms, with the exception of quotations. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Implicit Racial Bias and Students’ Fourth Amendment 
Rights, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 36) (explaining how “intense 
surveillance measures,” including SRO involvement in school searches and discipline, “are a 
component of involving more students in the criminal justice system”). 
 4. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). 
 5. Id. at 341–42. 
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conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies.”6  That 
nondecision is unsurprising because T.L.O. belongs to a body of Fourth 
Amendment cases involving “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement” that justify exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and 
probable cause requirements.7  That phrase—coined in Justice Harry 
Blackmun’s influential T.L.O. concurrence and used in a series of later 
Supreme Court cases—emphasizes the need to draw lines between law 
enforcement and school discipline searches.  Drawing that line in SRO-
involved searches became difficult for state courts. 
Although many state courts still have not decided the question nearly 
three-and-a-half decades after T.L.O., the majority that have apply T.L.O.’s 
reduced Fourth Amendment protections to SRO-involved searches.8  These 
decisions, reached mostly in the 1990s and early 2000s, hold that SROs are 
different than other law enforcement officers and they, unlike most officers, 
are not subject to normal Fourth Amendment limitations.  Several leading 
cases described SROs as school officials for Fourth Amendment purposes in 
all instances.9  Other cases effectively did the same, construing SROs as part 
of a school team and thus entitled to the same Fourth Amendment standard 
as other members of that team in individual instances.10 
These cases draw a line between SROs and other law enforcement officers.  
Other officers perform law enforcement searches, while SROs are on the 
school-discipline side of the line—even if they are sworn law enforcement 
officers who not only have power to arrest children but, in the relevant cases, 
do in fact arrest and charge children.  This line-drawing has been strongly 
criticized by academics and some courts.11  The roles of SROs blurred lines 
to some extent:  many SROs could and did engage in school discipline in 
addition to law enforcement duties.12 
Reforms largely enacted in the 2010s make it easier to draw a line between 
school officials and SROs for Fourth Amendment purposes.13  Responding 
to concerns about the school-to-prison pipeline and SROs’ role in it, reforms 
emphasize that SROs are law enforcement officers, not school 
disciplinarians, and should not become involved in school discipline.14  
Given the harms that come from a law enforcement response, especially to 
more minor misbehavior, these reforms posit that SROs should only become 
 
 6. Id. at 341 n.7. 
 7. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 8. See infra Part I.C. 
 9. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 10. See infra Part I.C.2. 
 11. See infra Part I.D. 
 12. To be clear, whether such policing behaviors that mix law enforcement and school 
discipline should qualify for T.L.O.’s rule is debatable, and, in my view, doubtful, because 
SROs’ roles in investigating crimes and arresting students should have placed them on the law 
enforcement side of the special needs doctrine’s line.  Nonetheless, courts adopting the 
majority rule could in the 1990s and early 2000s logically point to such mixed roles to justify 
treating SROs like school officials. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Parts III.C–D. 
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involved when more serious crimes occur or when immediate security risks 
exist.15  Such reforms are evident in federal administrative guidance; some 
state statutes, regulations, and administrative guidance; as well as many local 
memoranda of understanding between school districts and law enforcement 
agencies.16 
This Article is the first to explore how these 2010s reforms undermine the 
idea from 1990s and 2000s cases that SROs engage in school discipline just 
like school officials and thus undermine a basic pillar of the majority rule 
regarding SRO-involved searches.  These reforms show that SROs have a 
law enforcement role, which places them solidly on the law enforcement side 
of T.L.O.’s “special needs” line.  Building on prior critiques of the majority 
rule, this argument shows why courts should refuse to apply T.L.O.’s 
reasonable suspicion standard and exception to the warrant requirement to 
school searches involving SROs. 
These recent reforms also help explain why many school searches not 
directly involving SROs should not qualify for T.L.O.’s exception to the 
warrant and probable cause requirements.  A variety of laws and policies now 
require schools to turn over evidence of criminal activity to law enforcement, 
which transforms the character of searches conducted by school officials.17  
Consider a teenager suspected of possessing a cell phone stolen from another 
child.  A search conducted by an SRO for that cell phone and a search 
conducted by a school administrator under a policy requiring her to turn over 
evidence of crimes to the SRO both lead to the SRO having evidence of the 
crime and, often, arresting the child.  The Court in Ferguson v. City of 
Charleston,18 a post-T.L.O. special needs case, held that such disclosures of 
evidence to law enforcement render the special needs standard 
inapplicable.19  Recent reforms defining SROs’ roles as law enforcement 
mean that disclosing evidence to them represents a plain policy choice to 
transform a school search into a law enforcement matter.  It entangles school 
officials with law enforcement nearly as much as including law enforcement 
in the search itself and should trigger Ferguson’s result. 
These arguments are not without risks; declining to apply T.L.O. to school 
searches entangled with law enforcement could make it more difficult to 
search for weapons—a result many courts might find intolerable in an era of 
far-too-frequent school shootings.  This Article also offers an alternative 
doctrinal path to permitting warrantless searches with less than probable 
cause when there is reason to suspect deadly weapons are present in school.20  
Such situations call for Terry searches—searches intended to eliminate an 
immediate risk to individuals’ safety, and whose scope is tailored to the risk 
at issue.21  Such an approach is far more targeted to legitimate safety aims 
 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See infra Part III. 
 17. See infra Part IV.B. 
 18. 532 U.S. 67 (2001). 
 19. Id. at 84. 
 20. See infra notes 390–400 and accompanying text. 
 21. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968). 
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than applying T.L.O. wholesale, and it limits the risk that reduced Fourth 
Amendment standards will continue to contribute to the school-to-prison 
pipeline. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides the doctrinal background.  
It analyzes T.L.O., its holding regarding searches by school officials without 
law enforcement entanglement, and its implications for cases involving such 
entanglement.  Part I also explores how subsequent Supreme Court school-
search cases address related issues but do not change the underlying analysis, 
and explains and critiques the majority rule.  Part II summarizes the post-
T.L.O. growth of SROs and critiques of SROs’ roles as fueling the school-to-
prison pipeline.  Part III describes and illustrates the recent reforms that draw 
lines between law enforcement and school discipline, and limit SROs’ role 
to law enforcement functions.  Part IV argues that these reforms require 
reexamination of state rules permitting SRO searches under reasonable 
suspicion rather than probable cause and without a warrant.  Finally, Part V 
explores relatively narrow options to permit authorities to search for weapons 
at school to keep schools safe without raising the same school-to-prison 
pipeline concerns as broader permission for SRO searches. 
I.  HOW SROS OFTEN ESCAPED REGULAR FOURTH AMENDMENT 
LIMITATIONS 
No U.S. Supreme Court ruling definitively states the Fourth Amendment 
standard that applies to searches by or involving school resource officers.  
The Court decided its leading school-search case before SROs were as 
common as they are today, and subsequent Supreme Court school-search 
cases did not involve SROs.22  The Court has clearly held that school officials 
“acting alone and on their own authority” do not generally need to seek a 
warrant and may search based on reasonable suspicion, but it explicitly 
avoided any ruling on searches “conducted by school officials in conjunction 
with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies” or by law enforcement 
officers themselves.23  In that vacuum, most state courts to decide the issue 
have distinguished SROs from other police officers or construed searches 
involving SROs as ones initiated or primarily led by school officials.24  The 
majority of states that have decided these issues, therefore, apply the lowered 
Fourth Amendment standard for school officials to SROs.25 
This Part describes how this majority rule came to be, as well as contrary 
rules in other states and the critical commentary that the majority rule has 
engendered.  Neither Supreme Court nor state decisions have held that 
students always have a reduced expectation of privacy.  Crucially, the 
 
 22. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009) 
(explaining that an assistant principal and administrative assistant conducted the search of a 
student’s bag). 
 23. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985).  The Court cited a federal district 
court case holding that a police search at school required probable cause. Id. (citing Picha v. 
Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214, 1219–21 (N.D. Ill. 1976)). 
 24. See infra Part I.C.1. 
 25. See infra Part I.C. 
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majority rule depends on analogizing SROs’ roles to school officials’ and 
distinguishing those roles from other police officers. 
A.  A Lower Fourth Amendment Standard for School Officials’ 
Unique Roles 
In T.L.O., after an assistant principal searched a student’s purse and found 
marijuana,26 the subsequent juvenile court case presented a series of Fourth 
Amendment questions whose answers—or nonanswers—from the Court 
form the foundation for present law regarding school searches.  The Court 
made clear that students have some meaningful expectation of privacy at 
school, protected by the Fourth Amendment, but that the relationship 
between students and educators and the goals of maintaining discipline 
within schools justify an exception to the warrant and probable cause 
requirements.  The Court applied that exception to school officials,27 but it 
left unanswered whether the exception extends to searches by or involving 
law enforcement at school.28  Importantly, the Court’s analysis distinguishes 
searches by school officials from searches by law enforcement.  That 
distinction is particularly evident in T.L.O.’s concurring opinions, which 
were written by justices whose votes were essential to forming a majority 
and whose analysis shaped later cases. 
The first question presented by T.L.O. was whether the Fourth Amendment 
protected students from searches by educators at all.29  New Jersey argued 
that it did not because teachers could not be limited by the Fourth 
Amendment and because students lacked Fourth Amendment privacy 
interests.30  The Court rejected both ideas, holding that the Fourth 
Amendment governs school searches.31  The State emphasized the difference 
between law enforcement and school searches and argued “that the 
Amendment was intended to regulate only searches and seizures carried out 
by law enforcement officers” and not public school officials.32  This 
argument was easy to reject based on a long history, dating to the nineteenth 
century, in which the Court applied the Fourth Amendment to searches by 
civil authorities.33  The Court further held that school officials exercise state 
authority, not authority delegated by parents, so constitutional limitations 
must govern them as they govern any state actor.34 
 
 26. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 328. 
 27. Id. at 341. 
 28. See id. at 341 n.7. 
 29. Id. at 333. 
 30. Id. at 334. 
 31. Id. at 336–37. 
 32. Id. at 334. 
 33. Id. at 335. 
 34. Id. at 336.  In addition to prior cases treating school officials as state authorities, the 
Court emphasized compulsory education laws and the reality that school officials implement 
state educational and disciplinary policies to explain why it treats those officials as state actors. 
Id. at 336–37. 
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The State also argued that children at school had no reasonable expectation 
of privacy because that was “incompatib[le]” with “the maintenance of a 
sound educational environment” and because children did not need to have 
any personal items with them at school.35  Again, the Court easily rejected 
the argument by noting the plainly legitimate reasons that students would 
carry private items to school—“the necessaries of personal hygiene” and 
“such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and 
diaries.”36  Searching a child or a closed bag held by the child “no less than 
a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubtedly a severe violation of 
subjective expectations of privacy.”37  In short, the Court recognized that 
children are entitled to some amount of privacy, and the Fourth Amendment 
protects them from unreasonable searches. 
Second, the Court held that school officials searching students at school 
may do so without a warrant and need only reasonable suspicion, not 
probable cause.38  Crucially, the rationale for this holding rested on the 
unique needs of school discipline and the relationships between educators 
and pupils.  The Court began its discussion by recognizing both the need for 
“a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures” and “the 
value of preserving the informality of the student-teacher relationship.”39  
The Court couched its specific holdings in reference to both of these 
elements.  The Court excused school officials from seeking warrants before 
searching students because that “would unduly interfere with the 
maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the 
schools.”40  The need of teachers and administrators to maintain order 
justified a standard less than probable cause—there must be “reasonable 
grounds” that the search will reveal evidence of violating the law or a school 
rule, and the scope of the search must be “reasonably related to the objectives 
of the search and not excessively intrusive.”41  This lower standard provided 
a particular benefit to teachers and other school staff—they would be 
“spare[d] . . . the necessity of schooling themselves in the niceties of 
probable cause.”42  This standard built on earlier cases, especially Terry v. 
 
 35. Id. at 338. 
 36. Id. at 339. 
 37. Id. at 337–38. 
 38. See id. at 367 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  While neither 
“probable cause” nor “reasonable suspicion” are easily defined standards, the former imposes 
more limits on government authority and more protection for individual liberty and privacy.  
As the Court noted in a later school-search case,  
Perhaps the best that can be said generally about the required knowledge component 
of probable cause for a law enforcement officer’s evidence search is that it raise[s] 
a “fair probability” or a “substantial chance” of discovering evidence of criminal 
activity.  The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a 
moderate chance of finding evidence of wrongdoing.  
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 
462 U.S. 213, 237, 243 n.13 (1983)). 
 39. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 342. 
 42. Id. at 343. 
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Ohio,43 which established an exception to the warrant and probable cause 
requirements for police officers to take “minimally necessary” action for a 
“protective seizure and search for weapons.”44  T.L.O. cited Terry for its two-
pronged test and to describe what reasonable suspicion is necessary to justify 
a search by school officials.45 
Importantly, T.L.O. authorized a much broader range of warrantless 
searches than Terry.  Terry approved limited searches for weapons deemed 
“necessary for the protection of [police officers] and others.”46  T.L.O., in 
contrast, authorized school officials to conduct warrantless searches 
whenever they reasonably suspect any legal or school rule violation.47 
T.L.O.’s concurring opinions—which, given the Court’s vote breakdown, 
are particularly important48—distinguish searches by school officials from 
searches by police even more explicitly and perhaps offer guidance for some 
principled limitations on searches authorized by T.L.O.  Justice Lewis 
Powell, Jr. wrote that teachers’ and students’ “close association with each 
other, both in the classroom and during recreation periods” reduces 
children’s expectation of privacy regarding those teachers.49  Justice Powell 
explicitly contrasted this “special relationship” with “[l]aw enforcement 
officers[, who] function as adversaries of criminal suspects,”50 and he further 
contrasted “establishing discipline and maintaining order” in schools with 
“the enforcement of criminal laws.”51 
Justice Blackmun also concurred, describing a test used by the Court to 
analyze a variety of searches conducted by individuals other than police or 
for reasons other than criminal law enforcement.52  Such searches, he wrote, 
could escape the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause 
requirements “[o]nly in those exceptional circumstances in which special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”53  School searches by school 
officials presented such special needs.  School discipline is very important 
and often requires “an immediate response,”54 and teachers should focus “on 
 
 43. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 44. Id. at 29–30. 
 45. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341–42, 345–46. 
 46. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (describing Terry as only 
permitting “steps to assure [an officer] that the person he has stopped to question is not armed 
with a weapon that could be used against him”). 
 47. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 355 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(describing the search in T.L.O. as more intrusive than the pat-down in Terry and observing 
that, “[w]isely, neither petitioner nor the Court today attempts to justify the search of T.L.O.’s 
pocketbook as a minimally intrusive search in the Terry line”). 
 48. Six justices supported the result in T.L.O., but Justice Lewis Powell, Jr.—joined by 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor—and Justice Harry Blackmun wrote concurring opinions. Id. 
at 326–27. 
 49. Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 50. Id. at 349. 
 51. Id. at 350. 
 52. See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 53. Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. Id. at 352–53. 
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teaching and helping students,” not “developing evidence” against students 
or considering “the complexities of probable cause” in particular situations.55  
Blackmun’s “special needs” test became the basis for later Supreme Court 
cases that determined when state actors were exempted from warrant and 
probable cause requirements before conducting a search, and these later cases 
underscored its distinction between “special needs” and “the normal need for 
law enforcement.”56 
Given the centrality of the discussion of school officials’ roles and 
relationships with students in the plurality and concurring opinions, and the 
explicit and implicit contrasts between school officials and police officers, it 
is no surprise that the Court declined to address police searches in school or 
searches conducted “in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement 
agencies.”57  After deciding several more cases involving searches “divorced 
from the State’s general interest in law enforcement,”58 the Court, in 2001, 
emphasized this limit on T.L.O.’s holding.59 
Indeed, there is little reason to think that the T.L.O. Court, writing years 
before SROs become prominent fixtures in public schools nationally and the 
development of policies intertwining school discipline and law enforcement, 
anticipated the Fourth Amendment questions raised by later SRO searches.  
T.L.O. assumed that any such overlap “is sufficiently rare to warrant treating 
the two institutions distinctly.”60  Once those developments arose, however, 
T.L.O.’s rationale set up an important question:  Are searches by school 
resource officers, or searches by school officials at the behest of or in 
conjunction with SROs, governed by T.L.O.?  Are SROs more like other 
police officers, and thus subject to normal Fourth Amendment rules, or are 
they more like school officials, whose special relationship with children 
justifies a lower standard? 
B.  Standards for SRO-Involved Searches Remain Unresolved by the 
Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court has examined school searches on several occasions 
since deciding T.L.O., but none of those cases has considered what standard 
should govern searches involving SROs.  This point is essential because, as 
T.L.O. made clear, determining Fourth Amendment standards is contextual,61 
and its analysis of the context shows that law enforcement searches should 
be treated differently.62  Its holding depends not on a generalized reduction 
of students’ Fourth Amendment rights at school, but on the particular context 
of searches by school officials in furtherance of maintaining school discipline 
 
 55. Id. at 353. 
 56. See, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001) (quoting T.L.O., 
469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 57. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7. 
 58. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79. 
 59. Id. at 79 n.15. 
 60. Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 880 (2012). 
 61. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. 
 62. See supra notes 26–60 and accompanying text. 
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and the educational environment.  No more recent Court case leads to a 
different result. 
This point bears emphasis because some have argued, I believe incorrectly, 
that the Court’s later school-search cases hold that children at school are a 
“special subpopulation” with reduced expectations of privacy justifying 
lower standards for searches.63  The most important cases in this regard are 
the Court’s two cases involving schools testing wide groups of students for 
drug use:  Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton64 and Board of Education 
v. Earls.65  Both cases involve fairly similar facts.  School districts required 
students who participated in certain voluntary activities—sports in Acton66 
and any extracurricular activity in Earls67—to consent to urinalysis drug 
tests.  Positive tests would require students to participate in a program 
intended to help children stop using drugs.  Failure to participate in such 
programs or failure to consent to drug tests would bar participation in 
voluntary activities but carry no law enforcement consequences.68 
Despite dicta that, when taken out of context, could suggest a more 
generalized reduction in schoolchildren’s Fourth Amendment rights,69 a 
closer and more contextual reading of the Court’s cases reveals a more 
nuanced rule.  In particular, children’s expectation of privacy at school 
depends on the context of a search70 and, especially, whether the search 
involves law enforcement actors, purposes, or consequences.  The Court 
recognized that evaluating an individual’s legitimate expectations of privacy 
“of course” requires a contextual analysis.71  And the Court’s contextual 
analysis made clear that it discussed searches involving only school 
officials,72 with consequences limited to voluntary school activities, not law 
enforcement.  Children’s supervision by a “schoolmaster” with “custodial 
and tutelary” duties comes with a degree of supervision and control that 
 
 63. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 254, 270–71 (2011). 
 64. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
 65. 536 U.S. 822 (2002). 
 66. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 648. 
 67. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 826 (noting that the policy applied to “any extracurricular 
activity” but “has been applied only to competitive extracurricular activities . . . such as 
Academic Team, Future Farmers of America, Future Homemakers of America, band, choir, 
pom pon, cheerleading, and athletics”). 
 68. Id. at 833–34; see also Acton, 515 U.S. at 650–51. 
 69. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (“A student’s privacy interest is limited in a public school 
environment where the State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.”); 
Acton, 515 U.S. at 655–56 (“[W]hile children assuredly do not ‘shed their constitutional 
rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate,’ the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children 
in school.” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)). 
 70. Kristin Henning, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Children at Home:  When Parental 
Authority Goes Too Far, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 55, 68–69 (2011). 
 71. Acton, 515 U.S. at 654. 
 72. T.L.O. refers to “teachers and administrators.” New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
341 (1985).  I use the broader phrase “school officials” to encompass other staff such as 
athletic coaches or nurses whose job duties could entail assisting with the school environment 
but would not include law enforcement. 
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reduces children’s privacy expectations vis-à-vis those schoolmasters.73  
This language echoes T.L.O.’s emphasis on the special relationship between 
teachers and students and offers no reason to suggest that this special 
relationship extends beyond educators, and especially not to law 
enforcement. 
If anything, Acton and Earls emphasized the distinction between school 
discipline and law enforcement even more than T.L.O.  The Court noted that 
a “rather critical consideration”74 in both cases was that consequences of the 
drug tests were relatively minor and, in particular, that law enforcement 
would not obtain the results so no delinquency or criminal charges would 
result.75 
More recent Supreme Court cases continue to leave the question of SRO-
involved school searches unaddressed.  Safford Unified School District #1 v. 
Redding76 held that the strip search of a thirteen-year-old girl suspected of 
possessing prescription-strength ibuprofen violated her Fourth Amendment 
rights, even if the individuals who conducted the search were entitled to 
qualified immunity.77  The Court’s summary of the facts does not indicate 
any law enforcement involvement or plans to involve law enforcement and, 
given that school officials found no evidence of any wrongdoing, there was 
nothing to turn over to law enforcement.78  The Court’s language carefully 
noted that T.L.O. applied to “searches by school officials,”79 before moving 
on to the focus of that case.80 
The absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling in any subsequent 
school-search case81 has largely left resolution of the question to state courts, 
which handle nearly all delinquency and criminal prosecutions of children 
based on searches at school. 
C.  The Majority Rule:  State Courts View SROs Like School Officials 
Without a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, state courts have 
decided in the first instance what Fourth Amendment standards to apply to 
SRO searches of students at school.  While many states’ courts have not yet 
 
 73. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 655). 
 74. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:  A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 10.11(c), at 631 n.139 (5th ed. 2012). 
 75. Earls, 536 U.S. at 829, 833–34; Acton, 515 U.S. at 658; see also Nance, supra note 3 
(manuscript at 52) (noting courts’ emphasis of the limited invasion of privacy in the searches 
at issue). 
 76. 557 U.S. 364 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 368. 
 78. Id. at 368–70, 372–73. 
 79. Id. at 370 (“We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the 
legality of a school administrator’s search of a student . . . .”). 
 80. Safford focused not on who conducted the search or the level of suspicion required, 
but on whether the scope of the search reasonably related to its basis; it did not. Id. at 373–77. 
 81. In addition to Acton, Earls, and Safford, the Court has also considered school seizures 
in a child-protection context. See generally Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. 692 (2011).  But the 
Court dismissed that case as moot. Id. at 698. 
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addressed the issue, the majority of state courts to do so have held that SROs 
could take advantage of T.L.O.’s reduced Fourth Amendment limitations.82 
Notably, the collective legal theory of these cases explicitly likens SROs 
to school officials and describe SROs’ tasks as including school discipline, 
assisting school staff, and even teaching classes.  These cases view any law 
enforcement purposes as either absent or subordinate to school disciplinary 
purposes.  This legal theory views SROs as unlike other police officers and 
views them instead as at most “quasi-law enforcement.”83  Courts ask 
whether SROs operate more like school officials who fall under T.L.O. or 
other police officers who do not,84 and the majority of courts have answered 
with the former. 
1.  Cases Explicitly Treating SROs as School Officials 
The leading case for the majority view is People v. Dilworth,85 a 1996 
Illinois Supreme Court case involving an SRO’s search of a student, Kenneth 
Dilworth, who an SRO suspected was selling drugs on school grounds.86  
Upon finding drugs on Dilworth, the SRO arrested him and the State 
prosecuted him as an adult in criminal court.87  Dilworth argued that the SRO 
needed probable cause because he was a police officer.88  The Illinois 
Supreme Court rejected this argument, concluding that the SRO was 
“properly considered to be a school official.”89  The court noted that the SRO 
was involved in both criminal and school disciplinary incidents, and it 
emphasized that blended role at least three times90 and explained that, like 
 
 82. Courts have acknowledged that this is the majority rule. See, e.g., R.D.S. v. State, 245 
S.W.3d 356, 367 (Tenn. 2008); see also EMILY MORGAN ET AL., COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, 
THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE CONSENSUS REPORT:  STRATEGIES FROM THE FIELD TO KEEP STUDENTS 
ENGAGED IN SCHOOL AND OUT OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 247 (2014); Developments in 
the Law—Policing Students, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1747, 1748 (2015) (concluding that “most 
courts hold that reasonable suspicion that a student is violating a law or school rule is 
constitutionally sufficient” for a search involving SROs). 
 83. Kirk A. Bailey, Legal Knowledge Related to School Violence and School Safety, in 
HANDBOOK OF SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND SCHOOL SAFETY:  FROM RESEARCH TO PRACTICE 31, 38 
(Shane R. Jimerson & Michael J. Furlong eds., 2006). 
 84. Id.; see also MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 247 (“Whether a municipal or county 
SRO or school police officer is considered a ‘school official’ is also a critical determination 
when it comes to the search standards to which officers are subject.”). 
 85. 661 N.E.2d 310 (Ill. 1996).  A Westlaw KeyCite search conducted on January 26, 
2019, showed that Dilworth has been cited in at least sixty-five cases, including twenty-three 
outside of Illinois.  It is also reported in law school casebooks as a leading case for its 
conclusion. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION 244 (5th ed. 2018); LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND THE 
LAW:  PUBLIC AND PRIVATE AUTHORITY IN THE HOME, SCHOOLS, AND JUVENILE COURTS 444 
(3d ed. 2012). 
 86. See Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 312–13 (summarizing facts); id. at 317 (concluding that 
the SRO was “conducting a search on his own initiative and authority”). 
 87. Id. at 314. 
 88. Id. at 316. 
 89. Id. at 320. 
 90. Id. at 313, 317, 320. 
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teachers, the officer “was authorized to give a detention.”91  As one 
commentator noted, this was “an SRO empowered to discipline students 
under the school’s rules.”92  Given this authority, the court concluded that 
the SRO’s search primarily furthered not law enforcement aims (despite the 
arrest and prosecution that immediately followed) but “the school’s attempt 
to maintain a proper educational environment.”93 
Dilworth’s view of the SRO as a school official—now reflecting the 
majority view94—echoes through cases holding that SROs can use T.L.O.’s 
lower Fourth Amendment standard.95  Multiple other state appellate courts 
cite Dilworth and apply T.L.O. to searches by SROs.96  These cases either 
cite and apply Dilworth without adding new analysis or assert a similar 
reason that SROs count as school officials for Fourth Amendment purposes.  
For instance, a Pennsylvania court wrote that SROs’ “presence in school 
buildings during the school day ensures the safety and security of the learning 
environment” to justify the court’s application of the reasonable suspicion 
standard rather than probable cause standard to SROs.97 
Other cases reach the same result.  A Florida appellate court held that 
SROs “should be treated as part of the school administrative team and not as 
outside police officers.”98  An Indiana appellate court held that a police 
officer acting as a school security officer on school premises could use the 
T.L.O. standard,99 and the Indiana Supreme Court later offered some support 
for this result for SROs who “perform[] school-discipline duties” (though it 
 
 91. Id. at 313. 
 92. See Developments in the Law—Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1751. 
 93. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317. 
 94. Whether this rule was the majority rule at the time of Dilworth is subject to debate. 
Compare id. at 319–20 (citing cases in other jurisdictions that apply a reasonableness test to 
school police officer searches), with id. at 323 (Nickles, J., dissenting) (“All Federal and State 
decisions reviewed indicate that police officers, including police liaison officers, are required 
to have probable cause to search a student if they are significantly involved in the search.”). 
 95. See, e.g., In re Devon T., 584 A.2d 1287, 1300 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (applying 
T.L.O. to a school security guard identified as an “officer” who placed the child under arrest 
and who the court distinguished from “an investigative police officer”); Russell v. State, 74 
S.W.3d 887, 892 (Tex. App. 2002) (“We believe the Dilworth analysis properly 
applies . . . .”). 
 96. See, e.g., In re William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695, 699–701 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. 
D.S., 685 So. 2d 41, 43 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (“We specifically hold that a search 
conducted by a school police officer only requires reasonable suspicion . . . as distinguished 
from the probable cause that is usually required to support a search conducted, away from the 
school property, by an outside police officer . . . .”); In re Ana E., No. D-10378/01, 2002 WL 
264325, at *9–11 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Jan. 14, 2002) (citing Dilworth and holding that SROs 
supervised by the New York Police Department only needed reasonable suspicion to search 
students); Commonwealth v. J.B., 719 A.2d 1058, 1065 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“A reasonable 
suspicion standard applies when school officials, including teachers, teachers’ aides, school 
administrators, school police officers and local police school liaison officers, conduct a search 
acting on their own authority.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 97. J.B., 719 A.2d at 1066; see also William V., 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 700 (asserting that there 
is no distinction between school-employed security and city-employed police stationed at 
schools and expressing concern about establishing incentives for schools to use the former 
rather than the latter). 
 98. M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563, 565 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 99. S.A. v. State, 654 N.E.2d 791, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995). 
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did leave open the possibility that SROs who perform law enforcement duties 
might not benefit from the same result).100  Other cases apply T.L.O. to SRO-
involved searches without analysis or explanation.101 
The view of SROs as school officials also appears in an Indiana statute, 
which seems to be an effort to apply that lower standard in all cases in the 
face of more nuanced court decisions.  After the Indiana Supreme Court 
suggested that SRO searches under T.L.O. depended on SROs pursuing 
school-discipline rather than law enforcement duties,102 the Indiana 
legislature enacted a statute permitting an SRO to use the reasonable 
suspicion standard for searches and seizures without limitation.103  The 
Indiana statute somewhat ironically also asserts law enforcement powers—
clarifying that SROs may make arrests, carry firearms, and “exercise other 
police powers”—all while taking advantage of T.L.O.’s special needs 
standard designed for educators.104 
Such statutes represent a codification of the majority rule and thus help 
illustrate the scope of that rule’s application.  These statutes cannot, however, 
force a particular constitutional result for those subject to them.  As the 
leading Fourth Amendment hornbook concludes, it “is quite clearly not the 
case” that the state may conduct a particular type of search by providing 
advance notice that it can.105 
2.  Cases Making It Easy to Establish SRO Involvement 
as Serving a School Purpose 
Several courts reached similar results through less direct means.  Rather 
than state explicitly that they would treat SROs as school officials, they 
examined the facts of specific searches to reach case-specific determinations 
that an SRO acted more like a school official than an officer.  This approach 
leaves open the possibility of applying the warrant and probable cause 
requirements in later SRO-involved search cases, but the analyses suggest 
such possibility is slim. 
These cases went to some length to find that SROs acted more like school 
officials and less like law enforcement.106  The Wisconsin Supreme Court 
 
 100. K.W. v. State, 984 N.E.2d 610, 613 (Ind. 2013); see also T.S. v. State, 863 N.E.2d 
362, 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding that the SRO “act[ed] to further educationally 
related goals” and was entitled to T.L.O.’s standard). 
 101. See, e.g., State v. Voss, 267 P.3d 735, 736, 738–39 (Idaho Ct. App. 2011) (noting SRO 
involvement and applying T.L.O. without discussion); State v. Taylor, 38 So. 3d 360 (La. 
2010); State v. Taylor, 50 So. 3d 922, 923 (La. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that an SRO searched 
a student); In re Steven A., 764 N.Y.S.2d 99, 99–100 (App. Div. 2003) (applying T.L.O. to a 
police department employee without explanation). 
 102. K.W., 984 N.E.2d at 613. 
 103. IND. CODE § 20-26-18.2-3(a)(2) (2017). 
 104. Id. § 20-26-18.2-3(a)(4). 
 105. See 5 LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 10.11(b), at 620. 
 106. See, e.g., State v. Alaniz, 815 N.W.2d 234, 239 (N.D. 2012) (applying T.L.O. to an 
SRO “who was working with other school officials to investigate violations of school rules 
and the law” even though the SRO used information gleaned from an out-of-school 
investigation to inform the principal of his suspicions regarding the child). 
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held that T.L.O. applies when SROs search students “at the request of, and in 
conjunction with, school authorities”; therefore, the school officials’ request 
effectively extended the school officials’ Fourth Amendment standards to 
law enforcement.107  That logic would seem to apply even if the school 
requested the SRO to search a student precisely because the student was 
suspected of committing a crime that the school believed required a law 
enforcement response.  Applying the Wisconsin case, a North Carolina 
appellate court concluded that SROs could use the T.L.O. standard when they 
searched a child in conjunction with the school principal—even when three 
armed and uniformed officers accompanied a single school official and when 
the school official consulted the officers about whether to search students.108  
A later North Carolina case extended that rule to cover a situation in which 
an SRO, on his own, suspected a child possessed marijuana and initiated a 
search; the court held that because the SRO “assisted school officials with 
school discipline” and “was furthering the school’s educational related goals 
when he stopped the juvenile,” T.L.O.’s standard would apply.109  Similarly, 
the New Mexico Court of Appeals described “a full-time, commissioned 
police officer assigned to a public high school as a resource officer”110 who 
worked both to enforce the criminal law and help maintain a positive 
educational environment.111  When a school official asked the SRO to search 
a student who the school official suspected of possessing drugs and an 
unknown object that presented a “safety issue,” the court concluded that “the 
officer was the arm of the school official” and was thus entitled to use the 
T.L.O. standard.112  In rejecting a child’s federal civil rights challenge to a 
search, the Eighth Circuit, like the state court in Dilworth, emphasized facts 
regarding an SRO’s role that made his purpose closer to school discipline, 
especially that the SRO was “instructed to cooperate with the school 
officials.”113  Accordingly, when school officials asked the SRO for 
assistance searching a child, the court concluded that the SRO’s involvement 
 
 107. See In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Wis. 1997); see also In re Sumpter, 
No. 2004-CA-00161, 2004 WL 2806428, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2004) (applying 
T.L.O. when an assistant principal requested that an SRO search a student because the search 
was initiated by school staff, not the SRO); F.S.E. v. State, 993 P.2d 771, 773 (Okla. 1999) 
(“[A] school official may utilize law enforcement to assist with an investigation or search of 
a student . . . so long as the public school official has a reasonable suspicion . . . .”). 
 108. See In re D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346, 348, 352–54 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 109. In re S.W., 614 S.E.2d 424, 425, 427 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005). 
 110. In re Josue T., 989 P.2d 431, 433 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that the SRO “searched 
a student at the behest of a school official”).  This language suggests that a different rule might 
apply if the SRO acted on his own authority. 
 111. Id. at 437. 
 112. Id.; see also In re J.D., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 471 (Ct. App. 2014) (holding that T.L.O. 
applied to a search initiated by “campus security officers” who were “acting at the behest of 
Richmond High School administrators”).  More limited involvement in one case—when a 
school administrator searched a student while SROs happened to be in the same room—led to 
the same result. State v. Burdette, 225 P.3d 736, 738 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010). 
 113. Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 190 (8th Cir. 1987). 
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did not change the character of the search from school discipline to law 
enforcement.114 
Although these cases do not state an absolute rule that SRO-involved 
searches always qualify for T.L.O.’s standard, their analysis and dicta suggest 
that they usually will.  These cases describe SROs as part of the school’s 
team, explicitly authorized and encouraged to engage in ordinary school 
discipline, and as predominantly serving schools’ special needs and only 
rarely serving law enforcement goals.  After reciting various security 
concerns present in schools, the Wisconsin Supreme Court said it “may 
reasonably infer” that an SRO stationed full-time at a school has a core 
mission of “assist[ing] school officials in maintaining a safe and proper 
educational environment,” a goal which triggered the T.L.O. standard.115  
The North Carolina Court of Appeals similarly “infer[red]” that SROs served 
goals related to the educational environment even without stating evidence 
supporting such an inference.116  Both cases involved students suspected of 
possessing illegal contraband who, in fact, were detained and charged once 
contraband was found on them.117  Yet neither addressed when, if ever, an 
SRO search could have primarily law enforcement goals.  One unpublished 
case illustrates the narrow circumstances in which this analysis would lead a 
court to not apply T.L.O.—when school officials had already “completed 
[their] investigation” of the student and imposed discipline, which made it 
impossible to construe a subsequent search by the SRO as anything other 
than law enforcement.118  A slight change of facts would make that case look 
like other SRO-involved searches deemed to fall under T.L.O. 
Notably, these cases do not address the criminal or juvenile justice 
consequences of particular searches.  These searches, presumably conducted 
for school disciplinary purposes, led to some kind of law enforcement 
consequences, usually arrests and charges, and often for relatively minimal 
behavior—such as the child who borrowed a knife from another student on a 
school bus and was charged with possessing a dangerous weapon on school 
property.119  Because the courts viewed these cases as involving school 
searches, they left those consequences unaddressed. 
 
 114. Id. at 191–92.  The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed this approach in Shade v. City of 
Farmington, in which it rejected a challenge to a search by SROs “[b]ecause school officials 
initiated the investigation and search . . . in furtherance of the school’s interest in maintaining 
a safe learning environment, and because they asked officers to assist them in furtherance of 
that interest . . . .” 309 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002). 
 115. In re Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d 682, 690 (Wis. 1997). 
 116. In re D.D., 554 S.E.2d 346, 354 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 117. Id. at 350; Angelia D.B., 564 N.W.2d at 684. 
 118. In re Welfare of T.D.B., No. 13-JV-15-142, 2018 WL 492641, at *6 (Minn. Ct. App. 
Jan. 22, 2018).  Perhaps notably, this is a more recent case, decided in 2018, after the reforms 
discussed in Part III. 
 119. Shade, 309 F.3d at 1058; see also, e.g., Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188, 190 (8th Cir. 
1987) (describing how an SRO gave child suspects “juvenile appearance cards” to report to 
the police station); State v. Burdette, 225 P.3d 736, 738 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (charging the 
child with possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia); R.D.S. v. State, 245 
S.W.3d 356, 361 (Tenn. 2008) (charging the child with simple possession or casual exchange 
of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia). 
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The lack of analysis of the consequences of searches is consistent with the 
broad approval of T.L.O.’s application to searches conducted by school 
officials regardless of what those officials do with the fruits of the search.  
Dilworth’s analysis began by noting that school officials benefit from 
T.L.O.’s reduced Fourth Amendment standard.120  One illustrative trial court 
explained, “The Court finds the school has an absolute right to conduct 
searches for protection of students and there’s no showing here that any of 
this search was as a result of officer action.”121  One element that might 
distinguish such searches from T.L.O. is that school districts now have 
policies and agreements with law enforcement requiring school officials to 
turn over evidence of crimes discovered in school searches.122  By focusing 
on whether the search itself “was a result of officer action,” courts avoid 
analyzing whether those policies and agreements affect T.L.O.’s 
applicability.  That issue is explored in Part I.D.2, which describes critiques 
of the majority rule. 
3.  Cases Do Not Generally Hold That Children Are 
Always Entitled to Less Privacy 
An important corollary to state courts’ arguments that SROs are school 
officials for Fourth Amendment purposes is that children at school are not 
susceptible to searches and seizures based on the reasonable suspicion 
standard in all circumstances—only when searched by someone who 
qualifies as a school official.  If children’s expectation of privacy at school 
was reduced in all circumstances, these cases would have been much easier 
for courts to decide—they would not have to analyze SROs’ roles and 
articulate how they qualify as school officials. 
That said, Dilworth implies that children do have reduced expectations of 
privacy.  Dilworth applied Acton’s balancing test, and quoted it as providing 
that “students within the school environment have a lesser expectation of 
privacy than members of the population generally.”123  That citation cannot 
fairly be read as supporting a holding that children always have a reduced 
expectation of privacy at school.124  At least one state court has held 
 
 120. People v. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d 310, 317 (Ill. 1996); see also State v. Scott, 630 S.E.2d 
563, 565 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (recognizing “a bright line between searches conducted solely 
by school officials and those involving a law enforcement officer” and holding that the former 
are “subject only to the most minimal restraints necessary to insure that students are not 
whimsically stripped of personal privacy and subjected to petty tyranny” (quoting State v. 
Young, 216 S.E.2d 586, 593 (Ga. 1975))). 
 121. A.W. v. State, 510 S.W.3d 811, 814 (Ark. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting the trial court). 
 122. See infra Part IV.B. 
 123. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 318 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 
(1995)). 
 124. See Barry C. Feld, T.L.O and Redding’s Unanswered (Misanswered) Fourth 
Amendment Questions:  Few Rights and Fewer Remedies, 80 MISS. L.J. 847, 888–89 (2011) 
(criticizing Dilworth’s use of the Acton factors); Henning, supra note 70, at 68–69 (describing 
the proper analysis as context-specific). 
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similarly, also citing Acton, though this case is an outlier compared to those 
discussed in Parts I.C.1 and I.C.2.125 
Any suggestion or holding that children have lesser expectations of 
privacy in reference to any search at school is hard to square with the cases 
those courts rely upon.  Crucially, the Acton language came in the context of 
a search by school officials with no law enforcement consequences, as 
discussed in Part I.B above.  And the cited Acton language includes a quote 
from Justice Powell’s T.L.O. concurrence which, as discussed in Part I.A 
above, explicitly contrasted school officials’ searches from law enforcement 
searches.126 
Moreover, both Dilworth, individually, and the weight of state court 
opinions, more generally, make clear that students sometimes do have a 
significant expectation of privacy at school.  Dilworth indicates that when 
“outside police officers” conduct or initiate a search, probable cause is 
required127—a holding which reaffirms that who does the search and, 
perhaps, the reasonably expected consequences of that search, matter to the 
Fourth Amendment standard.  If children always had a reduced expectation 
of privacy at school, then the identity of the person searching them would not 
matter.  Yet courts almost universally have held that searches by outside 
police officers at school do not trigger T.L.O.’s standard.128 
That distinction regarding outside police officers suggests two essential 
points.  First, it underscores how these cases, rightly or wrongly, treat SROs 
differently than other police officers and the importance of how the law 
characterizes SROs’ roles.  Second, it shows that the purpose of a search and 
the identity of the searcher provide the decisive context for determining the 
proper Fourth Amendment standard.129  Instead of holding that children 
always lack a reasonable expectation of privacy, Dilworth and cases holding 
similarly rely on the identification of SROs as acting more like school 
officials tasked with primarily protecting a school’s learning environment 
than law enforcement officers.  Dilworth and its progeny reflect not a 
rewriting of T.L.O.’s holding about students’ reasonable expectation of 
privacy writ large, but an SRO-specific conclusion that classified SROs as 
school officials and made that classification define the boundary between 
special needs searches under T.L.O. and normal law enforcement searches. 
 
 125. See Lindsey ex rel. Lindsey v. Caddo Par. Sch. Bd., 954 So. 2d 272, 274 (La. Ct. App. 
2007). 
 126. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 127. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 317. 
 128. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Villagran, 81 N.E.3d 310, 314 (Mass. 2017) (declining to 
apply T.L.O. to a search by a non-SRO police officer); State v. Tywayne H., 933 P.2d 251, 
253–56 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997) (same); In re Thomas B.D., 486 S.E.2d 498, 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 
1997) (same); see also 5 LAFAVE, supra note 74, § 10.11(b), at 627 (“This is certainly the 
correct conclusion when an officer whose duties normally are performed elsewhere comes to 
the school and initiates a search there or gets school officials to so act on his behalf.”). 
 129. In re D.D., 54 S.E.2d 346, 352–53 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
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D.  Longstanding Criticisms of the Majority Rule 
Dilworth’s majority rule is not without dissenters, both among courts and 
commentators. 
1.  Minority Jurisdictions 
While Dilworth and other cases discussed in Part I.C represent the majority 
rule, that rule is not universally accepted.  Dilworth’s dissenting opinion 
argued that SROs are more accurately considered law enforcement officers 
for Fourth Amendment purposes.130  More importantly, several state courts 
have adopted the dissent’s view, concluding that SROs qualify as law 
enforcement officers and distinguishing them from school officials.  In 2012, 
the Washington Supreme Court refused to apply T.L.O. to a search by an 
SRO because his law enforcement role created “a fundamental difference” 
with a search by school officials.131  The facts of the SRO’s role mattered.  
While the SRO in Dilworth had authority to impose school disciplinary 
consequences on students,132 the Washington SRO “ha[d] no authority to 
discipline students.”133  The New Hampshire Supreme Court refused to apply 
T.L.O. to an SRO whose “job essentially was to investigate criminal activity 
on school grounds,” and who had an agreement with the school principal that 
the school would handle discipline and the SRO would handle criminal law 
enforcement.134  A Georgia appellate court ruled that SROs cannot use T.L.O. 
but did not offer much of an explanation for that conclusion.135  And Iowa 
has codified a rule preventing peace officers from using T.L.O.’s relaxed 
standard.136 
Tennessee has placed itself in a middle ground that emphasizes the 
importance of closely analyzing SROs’ role.  The Tennessee Supreme Court 
held that the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard for a search conducted 
by an SRO at school depends on whether the SRO’s “duties more closely 
align with the duties of a school official.”137  Applying that lower standard 
requires finding that the SRO’s duties are “beyond those of a[n] ordinary law 
 
 130. Dilworth, 661 N.E.2d at 321 (Nickels, J., dissenting); see also M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 
563, 568–71 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (Hawkes, J., dissenting) (arguing that SROs are not 
school officials and thus may not rely on T.L.O.). 
 131. State v. Meneese, 282 P.3d 83, 86 (Wash. 2012) (en banc). 
 132. See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text. 
 133. Meneese, 282 P.3d at 87. 
 134. State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 636 (N.H. 2001).  The facts of Heirtzler were more 
complicated, involving a referral of suspicious activity from a teacher to the SRO to school 
administrators, who conducted the search and then turned its fruits over to the officer. Id. at 
637.  These facts are discussed in Part IV.B. 
 135. Patman v. State, 537 S.E.2d 118, 120 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).  Additionally, a Florida 
appellate court also ruled that an SRO cannot use T.L.O. A.J.M. v. State, 617 So. 2d 1137, 
1138 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).  However, a more recent Florida case came to the opposite 
conclusion. M.D. v. State, 65 So. 3d 563, 566 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). 
 136. IOWA CODE § 808A.3 (2015).  The Iowa code limits T.L.O. to school officials, and it 
defines such officials to include “unlicensed school employees employed for security or 
supervision purposes” but not officers. Id. § 808A.1(3). 
 137. R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 370 (Tenn. 2008). 
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enforcement officer such that he or she may be considered a school official 
as well as a law enforcement officer.”138  The court remained neutral on 
whether this test was met and remanded for further proceedings.139  The 
unpublished decision on remand concludes that the SRO was a law 
enforcement officer and therefore needed probable cause,140 but no 
precedential opinion decides the issue beyond that case. 
In addition to state courts adopting the minority rule for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, several other courts have adopted a rule, in different 
contexts, which treats SROs as law enforcement officers.  Those cases 
address interrogations of students at school and determine what 
circumstances amount to custody for Miranda purposes.141  An interrogation 
by school officials alone does not generally amount to a custodial 
interrogation, which would require authorities to provide the Miranda 
warnings.142  Despite the majority rule for Fourth Amendment purposes, 
however, several courts and other state authorities have treated SROs as law 
enforcement officers when determining if a school interrogation is custodial 
for Miranda purposes.143 
2.  Critiques of the Majority Rule 
Academics have long criticized courts for applying a Fourth Amendment 
test designed for school disciplinary purposes to SRO-involved searches in 
 
 138. Id. at 369. 
 139. Id. at 370. 
 140. State v. R.D.S., No. M2008-01724-COA-R3-JV, 2009 WL 2136324, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. July 16, 2009).  For further discussion of this case, see infra notes 356–59 and 
accompanying text. 
 141. Miranda requires authorities to inform suspects of their rights to silence and an 
attorney before authorities begin a custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
444 (1966). 
 142. See, e.g., Boynton v. Casey, 543 F. Supp. 995 (D. Me. 1982); Paul Holland, Schooling 
Miranda:  Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 LOY. L. REV. 
39, 40–41 (2006).  But see RANDY HERTZ, ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN 
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY CASES 614 (2015), https://njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/ 
Hertz-Trial-Manual-Update.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZFV5-EYMU] (noting that requiring a 
student to report to the principal’s office should be considered a custodial interrogation). 
 143. See, e.g., B.A. v. State, 100 N.E.3d 225 (Ind. 2018); N.C. v. Commonwealth, 396 
S.W.3d 852, 855 (Ky. 2013); In re R.J.E., 630 N.W.2d 457 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001), rev’d on 
other grounds, 642 N.W.2d 708 (Minn. 2002); State v. Antonio T., 352 P.3d 1172, 1180 (N.M. 
2015); In re R.H., 791 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. 2002); Ariz. Office of the Att’y Gen., No. I04-003, 
Opinion on Law Enforcement Interviews of Students at Public Schools, at 2 n.1 (2004).  Some 
of these cases possibly create tension with Fourth Amendment law in a particular state.  For 
instance, the Indiana Supreme Court held in B.A. that a student interrogated by a vice principal 
and SRO was in custody for Miranda purposes. B.A., 100 N.E.3d at 233.  But an Indiana 
statute, building on earlier state court precedent, provides that SROs may use the reasonable 
suspicion standard. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text. 
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school144 and even to searches only indirectly involving law enforcement.145  
Michael Pinard wrote that “the increased interdependency between law 
enforcement authorities and public school officials, as well as the increased 
use of the criminal justice system to monitor and punish behavior” require 
stronger Fourth Amendment protections than those provided by T.L.O. and 
cases like Dilworth.146  Barry Feld echoed these concerns, arguing that 
“[e]quating the search standard of school officials with SROs conflates the 
two despite the substantial difference in roles, disregards the greatly 
expanded police presence in school, and ignores the increased referrals of 
youths to juvenile courts from cases originating in schools.”147 
These arguments emphasize that SROs are law enforcement officers, 
regardless of any school disciplinary tasks in which they might engage.  
Federal law defining SROs (as part of a federal grant program) makes clear 
that SROs are “career law enforcement officer[s]” who should have “sworn 
authority.”148  SROs’ tasks are “to address crime and disorder problems,” 
including gangs and drugs at school, and to engage in a range of crime 
prevention and education efforts.149  Those other efforts might distinguish an 
SRO’s job from other officers, but they do not make the job something other 
than law enforcement; the federal statute describes these tasks as 
“community-oriented policing.”150  SROs’ law enforcement authority is 
evident in literally every case discussed in Part I.C—SROs in those cases 
arrested, charged, or somehow imposed a non-school-related, law 
enforcement consequence on students. 
Critiquing cases which involve SROs and other law enforcement officials 
only indirectly is more difficult.  In such cases, school officials suspect 
students possess evidence of a crime, search students for that evidence 
without SRO involvement, and then, following school district policies or 
agreements with law enforcement, turn over any such evidence they find to 
the SRO.151  While conducting searches without law enforcement 
superficially suggests that T.L.O. applies, the presence of policies requiring 
disclosure to law enforcement and post-T.L.O. special needs and 
administrative-search cases support a different view—such searches are so 
entangled with law enforcement that T.L.O. should no longer apply. 
 
 144. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 124, at 888–89; Josh Kagan, Reappraising T.L.O.’s 
“Special Needs” Doctrine in an Era of School-Law Enforcement Entanglement, 33 J.L. & 
EDUC. 291, 296 n.13 (2004); Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom:  
Reassessing Fourth Amendment Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law 
Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (2003); Developments in the Law—
Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1758–59.  T.L.O. itself has long been an unpopular opinion 
among academics. See, e.g., JUSTIN DRIVER, THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE:  PUBLIC EDUCATION, 
THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE BATTLE FOR THE AMERICAN MIND 194 (2018) (collecting early 
academic critiques of T.L.O.). 
 145. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 144, at 304–13. 
 146. See Pinard, supra note 144, at 1069–70. 
 147. See Feld, supra note 124, at 892. 
 148. See 34 U.S.C. § 10389(4) (2012). 
 149. See id. § 10389(4)(A). 
 150. Id. § 10389(4). 
 151. For examples of such cases, see supra notes 120–24 and accompanying text. 
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The U.S. Supreme Court offered support for this conclusion via Ferguson 
v. City of Charleston, in which it held that “extensive entanglement” with 
law enforcement prevented authorities from categorizing a search by nurses 
at a public hospital as a special needs search entitled to an exception from 
warrant and probable cause requirements.152  Ferguson involved a joint effort 
between the hospital, local police, local prosecutors, and substance abuse and 
child protection agencies to identify women who used illegal drugs while 
pregnant.153  Under protocols agreed upon by the hospital, police, and 
prosecutors, hospital staff would test pregnant and postpartum women for 
cocaine use and turn over positive tests to law enforcement.154  While the 
local government defendants asserted that “special non-law-enforcement 
purposes” satisfied T.L.O.’s special needs test,155 the Court concluded that 
the searches at issue were too entangled with law enforcement purposes for 
that test to apply.156 
The Court’s reasoning analogizes to school searches.  First, the Court 
noted that the only special needs searches it had approved were “divorced 
from the State’s general interest in law enforcement.”157  Consistent with that 
language, Ferguson emphasized both that T.L.O. should not be read to 
endorse school searches involving law enforcement158 and that the non-law-
enforcement consequences in Acton provided essential context for the 
searches at issue in that case.159 
Second, Ferguson emphasized that to determine whether the special needs 
test is met, the Court must perform a “close review” of the claimed special 
need.160  The Court offered different formulations of what this review should 
entail, but the bottom line is the same—“extensive entanglement of law 
enforcement cannot be justified by reference to legitimate needs.”161  The 
majority opinion sought to identify the “primary” and “programmatic 
purpose” of the searches.162  The Court recognized that the “ultimate” 
purpose of the searches involved “therapeutic” aims, but what mattered was 
the “immediate objective . . . to generate evidence for law enforcement 
purposes.”163  Concurring, Justice Anthony Kennedy critiqued the “ultimate 
goals” versus “immediate purposes” distinction,164 but he concluded that 
 
 152. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 83 n.20 (2001). 
 153. Id. at 70–71. 
 154. Id. at 72. 
 155. Id. at 73. 
 156. Id. at 79–84. 
 157. Id. at 79 (emphasis added). 
 158. Id. at 79 n.15. 
 159. See id. at 77–78 (noting that Acton only approved the loss of the ability to participate 
in an extracurricular activity). 
 160. Id. at 81 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997)). 
 161. Id. at 83 n.20. 
 162. Id. at 81. 
 163. Id. at 82–83, 83 n.20. 
 164. Id. at 86–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Five justices joined the majority opinion, and 
Justice Kennedy concurred separately. Id. at 69 (majority opinion). 
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“substantial law enforcement involvement” made the special needs test 
inapplicable: 
The special needs cases we have decided do not sustain the active use of 
law enforcement, including arrest and prosecutions, as an integral part of a 
program which seeks to achieve legitimate, civil objectives.  The traditional 
warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived in our previous cases 
on the explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the search is not 
intended to be used for law enforcement purposes.165 
Ferguson’s analysis underscores the importance of distinguishing law 
enforcement and school discipline goals when considering school 
searches.166  Just as school searches involving SROs may be intended to 
serve broad goals of maintaining a positive school environment, the searches 
in Ferguson sought to reduce drug abuse—but neither goal means the special 
needs test applies.  “[L]aw enforcement involvement always serves some 
broader social purpose or objective,” so closer analysis is required.167  In 
Ferguson, the Court could not distinguish legitimate special needs from the 
law enforcement action.  The Court reviewed official policies developed by 
a public entity and law enforcement, and where law enforcement officers 
“were extensively involved in the day-to-day administration of the 
policy.”168  In contemporary school searches, a “non-law enforcement 
special need for a search becomes indistinguishable from the law 
enforcement purposes of the search.”169 
Ferguson’s analysis also illustrates how a search’s consequences matter 
for determining whether that search must satisfy normal Fourth Amendment 
rules or instead qualifies as a special needs search.  Ferguson noted that a 
search that could disqualify an individual from an activity to which he had 
no constitutional entitlement—such as an extracurricular high school 
activity, as in Acton or Earls—involves a far more modest invasion of 
privacy than a search leading to law enforcement consequences.170  Focusing 
on such consequences both explains existing special needs case law and 
normatively justifies when Fourth Amendment rights should be greater or 
lesser.171  This focus on consequences evokes earlier cases that emphasized 
that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements may 
be waived when “nothing of constitutional magnitude is involved,”172 as well 
 
 165. Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 166. See Pinard, supra note 144, at 1101 n.174 (analogizing school officials required to 
report all criminal incidents to law enforcement to the hospital staff in Ferguson). 
 167. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84. 
 168. Id. at 82. 
 169. Developments in the Law—Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1760. 
 170. Id. at 1762. 
 171. Feld, supra note 124, at 918; Josh Gupta-Kagan, Beyond Law Enforcement:  Camreta 
v. Greene, Child Protection Investigations, and the Need to Reform the Fourth Amendment 
Special Needs Doctrine, 87 TUL. L. REV. 353, 406–21 (2012). 
 172. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971); see also Gupta-Kagan, supra note 171, 
at 408–09. 
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as scholarship endorsing “constitutional values” impacted by searches and 
seizures.173 
Giving a law enforcement officer with the power to arrest individuals the 
fruits of a search—and thus increasing the likelihood of arrests and charges—
imposes law enforcement consequences on school searches and should affect 
the Fourth Amendment analysis.174  At least one state appellate court has 
recognized that the more severe consequences included in “punishment for 
violating a criminal statute” as compared with violating school rules explains 
why law enforcement officers require probable cause before they may search 
someone.175  These consequences can, of course, flow even if law 
enforcement officers are not the ones conducting a search, especially when 
school policies or agreements require disclosure to law enforcement.  
Catherine Kim has made analogous arguments—that consequences 
involving the juvenile justice system cannot be said to serve children’s 
interests and thus differ from how T.L.O. imagined school discipline.176  
Given those consequences, practices that primarily serve law enforcement 
goals should trigger “the full scope of constitutional protections that would 
be available to youth outside of the school context,” meaning, at a minimum, 
that T.L.O. would not apply.177 
One state court has addressed these Ferguson-based arguments, but it 
unconvincingly attempted to distinguish that case.  In Commonwealth v. 
Lawrence L.,178 a child sought to suppress marijuana found in a search by a 
vice principal and turned over to law enforcement pursuant to an agreement 
between the school district and the local police department and district 
attorney’s office.179  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, 
held that this agreement did not render the school an “agent of the police” 
and that T.L.O. still applied.180  The court’s focus on agency is misplaced, as 
Ferguson focused on programmatic purposes and entanglement with law 
enforcement.181  The Massachusetts court then asserted that the “ultimate 
interests involved here differ substantially” from Ferguson, and, in 
particular, that school officials have an interest in “maintaining a safe 
learning environment and taking swift disciplinary action.”182  Yet the court 
offered no explanation as to why this interest trumped the law enforcement 
purposes codified in the agreement requiring disclosure of evidence by 
 
 173. Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 805 
(1994). 
 174. See Developments in the Law—Policing Students, supra note 82, at 1762 (“[T]he 
identity of who uses the result of a search does bear on the seriousness of the privacy 
intrusion.”). 
 175. R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 368 (Tenn. 2008). 
 176. See Kim, supra note 60, at 891–92. 
 177. Id. at 894. 
 178. 792 N.E.2d 109 (Mass. 2003). 
 179. Id. at 110–11. 
 180. Id. at 112–13.  The court framed its agency focus as rooted in the defendant’s 
argument. Id. 
 181. See supra notes 160–65 and accompanying text. 
 182. Lawrence L., 792 N.E.2d at 113. 
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school officials, or how the interest in school discipline differed from the 
public health interest in preventing the use of drugs during pregnancy and 
inducing individuals with drug problems to obtain substance abuse treatment.  
In the end, both Ferguson and school searches like that in Lawrence L. 
involved law enforcement purposes codified in memoranda of understanding 
with police departments and intertwined with legitimate special needs.  In 
addition, both led to law enforcement consequences that weigh against 
applying a special needs exception to the warrant requirement.183  Neither 
special need is adequately distinguished from law enforcement to justify 
T.L.O.’s application. 
II.  THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE AND CALLS TO 
REFORM THE ROLES OF SROS 
That the bulk of cases discussed in Parts I.C and I.D were decided in the 
1990s and 2000s is no coincidence—that is when SROs became a fixture of 
American schools.  The number of SROs grew substantially over the past 
generation, leading some to describe “[s]chool-based policing” as “the fastest 
growing area of law enforcement.”184  While SROs numbered less than 100 
in the 1970s, their numbers grew dramatically alongside concerns about 
crime at school and elsewhere in the 1980s and beyond:  there were 12,300 
SROs by 1997 and nearly 20,000 by 2007.185  A survey published in 2015 
reported that 30 percent of public schools nationally had SROs,186 and a 
majority of middle and high schools now have SROs.187  High-profile school 
shootings have catalyzed a range of actions to provide more SROs in 
schools.188 
 
 183. See supra notes 170–76 and accompanying text. 
 184. About NASRO, NAT’L ASS’N SCH. RESOURCE OFFICERS, https://nasro.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/4X5H-RV52] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); see also TOM R. TYLER & RICK 
TRINKNER, WHY CHILDREN FOLLOW RULES:  LEGAL SOCIALIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF LEGITIMACY 54 (2017) (describing the “unprecedented surge of law enforcement presence 
in schools”); Amanda Merkwae, Note, Schooling the Police:  Race, Disability and the 
Conduct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 158 (2015). 
 185. SARAH E. REDFIELD & JASON P. NANCE, ABA JOINT TASK FORCE ON REVERSING THE 
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 51 (2016), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/ 
administrative/diversity_pipeline/stp_preliminary_report_final.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/722A-29AZ]; see also R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 367 (Tenn. 2008) 
(“Since T.L.O. was decided, there has been an increasing presence of law enforcement officers 
in public schools . . . .”).  The number of SROs grew substantially between 1997 and 2008 
following federal grants supporting the hiring and training of more than 6500 new SROs. 
Barbara Fedders, The Anti-Pipeline Collaborative, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 565, 570–71 
(2016). 
 186. LUCINDA GRAY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PUBLIC SCHOOL SAFETY 
AND DISCIPLINE:  2013–14, at 10 tbl.7 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2015/2015051.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/A5DD-BR66]. 
 187. Fedders, supra note 185, at 571; see also TYLER & TRINKNER, supra note 184, at 163 
(discussing the increasing presence of law enforcement officers in schools). 
 188. See, e.g., MORGAN ET AL., supra note 82, at 196 (summarizing federal and state steps 
to increase SROs after the December 2012 massacre at an elementary school in Newtown, 
Connecticut).  Calls for increased numbers of SROs have followed more recent school 
shootings. F. Chris Curran, A School Resource Officer in Every School?, WTOP (Apr. 11, 
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As the numbers of school resource officers increased, so did several other 
trends.  First, SROs’ roles frequently expanded to include school discipline, 
consistent with the analysis of cases following the majority rule.  Second, 
other policies which directed more children to the juvenile and criminal 
justice systems for school-based incidents developed, and SROs’ roles 
furthered that trend.189  That development became known as the school-to-
prison pipeline, and criticisms of SROs’ broad roles became a featured 
element of research and advocacy to reform that pipeline.  Those criticisms 
informed later reform efforts, which are discussed in Part III. 
A.  SROs’ Roles 
That thousands of SROs were first stationed at public schools in the 1990s 
and 2000s is clear,190 but what precisely they did—and how much of their 
activities could be categorized as law enforcement and how much as serving 
an educational special need—was somewhat hard to define.  SROs follow a 
“triad” model, in which they engage in law enforcement, teach students 
(often about the law), and mentor students.191  A 2005 study of a variety of 
programs found that which corner of the triad received the most emphasis 
“varie[d] considerably across and within programs.”192  Other studies found 
similar variation.193 
Most SROs engaged in a range of activities well beyond law enforcement, 
and non-law-enforcement activity increased over time.  These activities were 
consistent with cases adopting the majority rule, which emphasized non-law-
enforcement roles.194  Some written agreements between law enforcement 
 
2018, 6:49 AM), https://wtop.com/education/2018/04/a-school-resource-officer-in-every-
school/ [https://perma.cc/ZC6M-MPRM]; Stephanie Saul et al., School Officer:  A Job with 
Many Roles and One Big Responsibility, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2018), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/03/04/us/school-resource-officers-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/ZTD4-HM6E]; 
Maayan Schechter & Jamie Self, Gov. McMaster Wants Police Officers in Every SC School. 
One Big Obstacle—Money, STATE (Mar. 1, 2018, 3:43 PM), https://www.thestate.com/ 
news/local/article202910609.html [https://perma.cc/6TSC-FV3Y]; Carly Zervis, Sheriff, 
School Board Agree:  More SROs Needed.  But How Many?, CITRUS COUNTY CHRON. (Mar. 
16, 2018), http://www.chronicleonline.com/news/education/sheriff-school-board-agree-
more-sros-needed-but-how-many/article_2a3c5488-292c-11e8-9a4e-d7c8c5e59103.html 
[https://perma.cc/UR2T-5YW3].  These calls have led to some increases in the number of 
schools with SROs. See, e.g., Press Release, S.C. Dep’t of Educ., 38 South Carolina School 
Districts to Receive Funding for New School Resource Officers (Sept. 5, 2018), 
https://ed.sc.gov/newsroom/news-releases/38-south-carolina-school-districts-to-receive-
funding-for-new-school-resource-officers/ [https://perma.cc/27S4-2VU3].  Such efforts are 
contested. See, e.g., ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., POLICE IN SCHOOLS ARE NOT THE ANSWER 
TO SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 3 (2018), https://dignityinschools.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ 
Police-In-Schools-2018-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WKD2-PJP8]. 
 189. See, e.g., Jason P. Nance, Dismantling the School-to-Prison Pipeline:  Tools for 
Change, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 313, 327–31 (2016) (describing various contributors to the pipeline). 
 190. See Fedders, supra note 185, at 567. 
 191. PETER FINN ET AL., COMPARISON OF PROGRAM ACTIVITIES AND LESSONS LEARNED 
AMONG 19 SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER (SRO) PROGRAMS 1 (2005). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Kim, supra note 60, at 882–83. 
 194. FINN ET AL., supra note 191, at 13; see also The Evolving Role of Police in Schools, 
TEX. SCH. SAFETY CTR., https://txssc.txstate.edu/topics/law-enforcement/articles/evolving-
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agencies and school districts specified that SROs should “enforce the school 
district’s student disciplinary process.”195  Some memoranda of 
understanding (MOUs) called on SROs to avoid any school disciplinary 
work, but many others lacked clear descriptions of SROs’ intended 
activities.196  In practice, that led to SROs engaging in a range of activity 
beyond traditional law enforcement.  One report highlighted an SRO who 
admitted “playing [school discipline] by ear” and eventually asserting a 
greater role in writing school discipline reports on issues as minor as school 
uniform violations.197  Surveys of law enforcement agencies with SRO 
programs found that SROs spent, on average, half of their time on law 
enforcement activities and the rest on other activities (though those surveys 
did not define “law enforcement activities”).198 
One report funded by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) on SRO 
activities implied that law enforcement activities would blend with school 
discipline, and it described the effects of SROs “arresting, citing, or turning 
in students to school administrators” and referred to the children receiving 
this response not as delinquents but with broader language such as 
“troublemakers.”199  The report went on to critically describe one school 
principal’s efforts to limit SROs to a law enforcement role.200  The report 
suggested that a model in which SROs became engaged in a wide set of 
activities was both better and more common.  In practice, this meant an 
entirely novel shift in school discipline; as one scholar put it, “[T]he 
introduction of law enforcement officers into schools has transformed 
student misconduct into a matter to be dealt with by the criminal justice 
system.”201 
B.  The School-to-Prison Pipeline and Reform Efforts 
The growth in the number of SROs and the expansion of their roles into 
school discipline did not occur in a vacuum.  It began in the 1990s, at a time 
when concern about juvenile crime—which peaked in 1994 and has steadily 
declined since—led to a range of reforms that treated children more 
punitively.202  At the same time, policies and practices developed which 
furthered the “criminalization of school discipline.”203  State laws and school 
district policies required that schools refer student misbehavior in schools to 
 
role-of-police [https://perma.cc/6Z6Y-BX78] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019) (“[S]chool-based 
law enforcement officers have expanded their range of duties since they were first assigned to 
schools.”).  This point does not endorse those cases and only observes that some of those 
cases’ descriptive points were accurate. 
 195. FINN ET AL., supra note 191, at 31. 
 196. Id. at 24–26. 
 197. Id. at 30–31. 
 198. Id. at 14–15. 
 199. Id. at 19. 
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law enforcement.204  Broad criminal laws—such as those criminalizing any 
behavior which amounted to “disturbing schools”—rendered a large swath 
of adolescent misbehavior criminal.205  In combination with these policies, 
SROs’ increased presence and involvement in school discipline led to a sharp 
increase in arrests for incidents arising at school.206  Searches involving 
SROs, in particular, “increase the likelihood of . . . being swept into the 
juvenile justice system by being arrested, adjudicated, or detained.”207 
Schools became a primary source of delinquency cases referred to juvenile 
court.  The proportion of all juvenile charges arising from incidents at school 
was found to be 17 percent nationally and significantly higher in some 
jurisdictions, which demonstrates a significant overlap between school 
discipline and law enforcement.208  Reformers named policies leading to 
these figures the “school-to-prison pipeline,” a phrase which began among 
academics and advocates,209 but which entities like the American Bar 
Association (ABA) and the DOJ have subsequently adopted.210 
This increased rate of school-based arrests and charges led to a reform 
movement that focused on SROs’ roles and sought to end the 
“criminalization” of school discipline.211  The same feature described by 
proponents as a feature of SROs’ presence at school—their involvement in 
school discipline—was, in the eyes of reformers, reason to worry that such 
involvement led to an increasing number of arrests for minor misbehavior.212  
A variety of studies concluded that children receiving law enforcement 
responses were dramatically harmed, especially when incarcerated but even 
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when an arrest did not lead to a juvenile court adjudication.213  Law 
enforcement responses to school misbehavior served neither broader school 
disciplinary goals—because they harmed the overall school 
environment214—nor broader crime control goals—because they increase the 
risk of recidivism.215 
Beyond these aggregate harms, reformers offered extreme stories of 
harmful uses of law enforcement in school discipline, often involving arrests 
in response to nonviolent misbehavior, especially by young children, 
disproportionate arrests of black youth, and aggressive police searches often 
with little or no suspicion.216 
These critiques, which are only briefly summarized here, have extended 
beyond academics to family court judges who adjudicate school-based 
delinquency cases.  The National Council of Juvenile and Family Court 
Judges criticized policies and practices which led to arresting and charging 
children for relatively minor conduct at school when less formal and less 
punitive approaches would have served children better.217  This leading 
national group of judges challenged criminalizing “minor infractions” as 
filling court dockets with frivolous cases that unnecessarily harmed 
children.218  Leading family court judges have written about the harms that 
come from arresting and charging children for such incidents.219  Other 
professional groups issued similar calls for reform beyond those whose 
ideology might make such critiques predictable.  The American 
Psychological Association, for instance, argued in 2008 that “minor, 
developmentally influenced misbehavior should not be interpreted or dealt 
with as a criminal infraction.”220  The Council of State Governments issued 
a report recognizing the concern regarding “the ticketing and arresting of 
students for minor offenses” and recommending reforms “to keep students 
engaged in school and out of the juvenile justice system.”221 
Relatively recent high-profile cases have highlighted these critiques—
such as video of an SRO pulling a teenage girl out of her desk and throwing 
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her across the floor while arresting her for disturbing school by refusing to 
put away a cell phone.222  Scholars have cited that case as a leading example 
of the harm school policing can create, especially when SROs are involved 
in “minor, quotidian in-school misbehavior” and transform such incidents 
into law enforcement and juvenile court matters.223 
A central target for reforms has been the role of SROs, based explicitly on 
the concern that involving SROs in school discipline leads to unnecessary 
arrests of students—especially students of color—for what the ABA termed 
“trivial infractions.”224  Multiple studies have found that assigning SROs to 
schools increased the number of arrests for low-level offenses, even when 
taking into account various measures for the rates of crime in and around 
schools and legal requirements to report certain crimes to law 
enforcement.225  Chongmin Na and Denise Gottfredson found that, after 
controlling for previous crime rates, SRO presence led to an increase in the 
rate of reporting minor violent crimes—simple assaults and other charges 
arising largely from fights between students—showing that “increased use of 
SROs facilitates the formal processing of minor offenses.”226  Matthew 
Theriot found more nuanced but consistent results:  SROs’ presence reduced 
the likelihood of school-based arrests for weapons possession (perhaps by 
deterring students from bringing weapons to school), a finding in tension 
with other studies.227  Even so, Theriot found that SROs’ presence resulted 
in an even larger increase—more than 100 percent—in arrests for disorderly 
conduct, the most common charge in the jurisdictions studied.228  Judges 
have written that SROs’ law enforcement role “dictates” more arrests for 
such conduct.229  Reduced Fourth Amendment standards through the 
application of T.L.O. to SRO-involved searches surely can contribute to 
increased arrests as well.230 
These findings, coupled with other factors, increased concern that racial 
disparities are particularly—and unjustifiably—large in school-based arrests.  
Jason Nance found that the percentage of nonwhite students at a school “is a 
strong predictor of whether the school uses a combination of strict security 
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measures.”231  Nonwhite students, therefore, are more likely to go to a school 
with SROs and thus face the results of increased arrests.232  Moreover, in 
practice, Nance has shown that “extreme surveillance measures” impose a 
range of harms on schools and students.233 
These criticisms of the school-to-prison pipeline emphasize one central 
proposal:  SROs should be less involved in incidents of minor misbehavior, 
which should instead be the subject of school discipline.234  As Theriot 
explained: 
[I]t . . . is important to change teachers’ and school administrators’ 
expectations of SRO interventions. . . .  [T]eachers more often are turning 
to police officers to handle difficult students.  Teachers and principals are 
ignoring the “teachable moments” that come from student misbehavior and 
failing to take advantage of opportunities to work with adolescents in 
need.235 
Relatedly, evidence accumulated to show that using police officers to 
enforce school discipline (and the arrests and charges which result) harmed 
students.  Students who were arrested had higher school dropout and 
recidivism rates, and such arrests were not found to improve school discipline 
for students who were not punished.236 
Courts have also begun to question the policy wisdom of, and raise legal 
concerns unrelated to the Fourth Amendment about, involving SROs in 
school discipline.  Then-Judge Neil Gorsuch critiqued an SRO’s involvement 
in a case involving a middle school child’s repeated burping in gym class, 
which culminated in the SRO arresting the child for “interfer[ing] with the 
educational process.”237  That case provides a vivid illustration of how 
stationing SROs at schools and involving them in ordinary school discipline 
incidents leads to unnecessary arrests.  In that case, a middle schooler 
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“generated several fake burps” in gym class, “which made the other students 
laugh and hampered class proceedings.”238  The teacher then made the child 
sit in the hallway, but the child “leaned into the classroom entranceway and 
continued to burp and laugh.”239  The teacher then called the SRO regarding 
this repeated childish behavior, and the SRO arrested the child.240  The Tenth 
Circuit decided the case based on the scope of the state criminal statute.241  
In dissent, Judge Gorsuch harshly criticized the notion that the SRO had any 
business in responding to a mildly disruptive student: 
If a seventh grader starts trading fake burps for laughs in gym class, what’s 
a teacher to do?  Order extra laps?  Detention?  A trip to the principal’s 
office?  Maybe.  But then again, maybe that’s too old school.  Maybe today 
you call a police officer.  And maybe today the officer decides that, instead 
of just escorting the now compliant thirteen year old to the principal’s 
office, an arrest would be a better idea.  So out come the handcuffs and off 
goes the child to juvenile detention.242 
The result, Gorsuch wrote, was to make the law “a ass.”243 
Even more forcefully (if less colorfully), the Fourth Circuit criticized 
unnecessary law enforcement responses to routine school disciplinary 
matters in E.W. ex rel. T.W. v. Dolgos.244  That case involved a ten-year-old 
elementary school student arrested for a fight with another child on a school 
bus several days prior to her arrest.245  She filed a claim for excessive force 
against the SRO, who handcuffed her when making the arrest.246  Though 
ruling for the SRO on immunity grounds, the Fourth Circuit suggested that 
teachers could routinely handle minor fights without SROs or the use of 
force.247  It also questioned law enforcement’s response to children who 
commit “minor offenses” at school: 
Unnecessarily handcuffing and criminally punishing young schoolchildren 
is undoubtedly humiliating, scarring, and emotionally damaging.  We must 
be mindful of the long-lasting impact such actions have on these children 
and their ability to flourish and lead prosperous lives—an impact that 
should be a matter of grave concern for us all.248 
These cases reflect growing concern about the point that was foundational 
to Dilworth and other cases applying T.L.O. to school searches—the notion 
that SROs are like other school officials and not like law enforcement.  The 
crux of these criticisms is that SROs are like law enforcement and that law 
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enforcement responses are inappropriate for routine school discipline.  As 
Part III establishes, that criticism has led to clearer demarcation between law 
enforcement and school discipline and a clearer understanding that SROs are 
law enforcement, not school officials.  Those reforms and demarcations 
require a reevaluation of decisions applying T.L.O. to SRO searches. 
III.  REFORMS DRAW CLEAR LINES BETWEEN SCHOOL DISCIPLINE 
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Courts decided the bulk of cases applying T.L.O. to SRO-involved 
searches in the 1990s and 2000s, as the number of SROs was increasing and 
as criticisms of SROs’ roles at schools were also growing.  In the 2010s, the 
reform movement described in Part II.B has taken root, and many 
jurisdictions across the United States have turned a corner toward “[t]he 
[d]ecriminalization of the [c]lassroom.”249  While much work remains to be 
done, we are now in a “children are different”250 era in which a deeper 
understanding of adolescent development is fostering reforms designed to 
make juvenile justice more rehabilitative and less punitive.251 
One set of these reforms is intended to keep children from facing 
delinquency and criminal charges for minor school-based misconduct and, 
more particularly, constrain the role of SROs so they are not involved in 
school discipline.  These reforms focus SROs’ time on more serious offenses 
requiring law enforcement responses252 and other law enforcement tasks like 
“intelligence gathering.”253  Crucially, many recent reforms make that shift 
explicit, drawing lines between SROs’ law enforcement focus and school 
discipline.  Those reforms, therefore, require a reevaluation of cases relying 
on the notion that SROs are school officials. 
This Part will describe the range of federal, state, and local reforms in the 
2010s that have cabined SROs’ work to law enforcement.  All of these 
reforms share a common central feature:  they all limit when SROs can be 
involved in school discipline and draw stark lines between law enforcement 
and school discipline.  While not every jurisdiction has adopted such 
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reforms—and thus not every jurisdiction faces the Fourth Amendment 
implications of those reforms discussed in Part IV—a geographically and 
politically diverse set of state and local governments have enacted these 
reforms. 
A.  Federal Reforms Push States and Localities to Limit SROs’ Roles 
The federal government has taken several steps in recent years to limit 
SROs’ role to law enforcement.  First, in 2014, the U.S. Department of 
Education (DOE) published “Guiding Principles” regarding school 
discipline.254  Those principles included “focus[ing] officers’ roles primarily 
on safety.”255  The DOE recommended that schools collaborate with local 
law enforcement agencies, but for discrete purposes distinct from general 
school discipline—for example, to develop plans for emergencies and for 
students returning to school after juvenile justice commitments.256  One of 
the DOE’s guiding principles was that SROs’ role should be “focused on 
protecting the physical safety of the school,” policing “criminal conduct of 
persons other than students,” and “reducing inappropriate student referrals to 
law enforcement.”257  The DOE’s vision for SROs was thus one focused on 
law enforcement:  SROs should “not become involved in routine school 
disciplinary matters,” and schools should not refer such matters to law 
enforcement.258 
Two years later, the DOJ and DOE issued joint guidelines for SROs with 
the explicit goal “to close a school-to-prison pipeline.”259  Two of their 
central recommendations are to “[e]liminate the involvement of SROs in 
non-criminal matters” and for schools and law enforcement agencies to enter 
into memoranda of understanding that clarify that SROs and school officials 
have “different roles,” especially related to minor school misbehavior.260 
Criticisms of the school-to-prison pipeline and concerns about the harms 
caused by turning disciplinary matters into delinquency cases animated the 
DOE’s guidance.  The DOE noted that keeping SROs focused on law 
enforcement improved both academic outcomes and school safety.261  It 
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further noted the value of reducing law enforcement referrals and juvenile 
justice system involvement, which reduces the collateral consequences of 
such involvement.262  On that issue, the DOE is supported by research 
showing that arrests or charges—even when they are ultimately dismissed—
increase the risk that children will drop out of high school.263  The DOE 
echoed concerns raised by critics of the school-to-prison pipeline about racial 
disproportionality in school-based arrests.264 
The Trump administration has indicated its approval of a central pillar of 
these reforms—the distinction between SROs’ law enforcement role and 
school discipline—even though it has indicated that it is likely to rescind 
related Obama administration guidance regarding school discipline.265  The 
Trump administration convened a Federal Commission on School Safety in 
the aftermath of the February 2018 mass shooting at Marjory Stoneman 
Douglas High School, and this Commission expressed doubts about the 
Obama administration’s focus on reducing racial disparities in school 
discipline and asserted that this guidance may have had a “chilling effect on 
classroom teachers’ and administrators’ use of discipline.”266  Whatever the 
merits or demerits of the Commission’s view on that point,267 its discussion 
of SROs, however, is consistent with the Obama administration’s 
commitment to distinguishing between their law enforcement duties and 
school discipline.  The Commission focused on SROs’ special law 
enforcement training—they are “best positioned to respond to acts of 
violence,”268 and the Commission emphasized the importance of clearly 
defining SROs’ roles as compared with school staff.269  The Commission 
cited only one model definition, and that example provides that SROs “will 
not be used to enforce” school district rules.270 
Moreover, the reforms that the Obama-era guidance furthered have 
continued to be implemented at the state and local level, in both politically 
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liberal and conservative jurisdictions, as described in the next several 
sections.  That guidance has wide bipartisan support, evident in a 2014 report 
from the bipartisan Council on State Governments, whose title emphasized 
the “consensus” nature of its recommendations.271  A core theme in the 
Council’s recommendations is drawing a line between law enforcement and 
school discipline and establishing policies to ensure SROs “are not used for 
classroom management and routine discipline.”272  Those recommendations 
echoed the federal guidance regarding limiting SROs’ role—they called for 
clear policies to prevent school officials from involving SROs in routine 
student disciplinary matters and noted increasing opposition from both law 
enforcement and educators to SRO involvement in such matters.273 
B.  State Reforms from Multiple Angles:  South Carolina 
One particularly dramatic set of reforms was enacted in South Carolina 
following the well-publicized use of force by an SRO against a student at 
Spring Valley High School in Columbia.274  An SRO was called to assist a 
teacher and school administrator with a school discipline matter—the student 
refused to put away her cell phone—and the SRO arrested her for disturbing 
school.275  In the county where that incident occurred, the local sheriff’s 
department and school district revised their memoranda of agreement to 
provide that “[f]irst and foremost the SROs will perform law enforcement 
duties” and that “[t]he SRO shall not act as a school disciplinarian, as 
disciplining students is a school responsibility.”276  In addition, in August 
2016, the Richland County Sheriff’s Department entered into a voluntary 
agreement with the DOJ.277  The voluntary agreement provides, perhaps 
more broadly, that SROs should not engage “in classroom management or 
school discipline matters that should be appropriately handled by school 
staff.”278 
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reforms and, in particular, for its language that requires school officials to report all crimes to 
SROs. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 137–38.  That critique goes not to the existence of a 
line between law enforcement and school discipline, but to where to place that line. 
 277. Letter from Michael Alston et al., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Leon Lott, Sheriff, 
Richland Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Aug. 10, 2016), https://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/RCSD-SRO-
ComplianceReview-08102016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH9U-EJ9T] (regarding the compliance 
review of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department). 
 278. Voluntary Resolution Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice 
and the Richland County Sheriff’s Department para. 4 (Aug. 9, 2016), https://ojp.gov/about/ 
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In 2017, the South Carolina Department of Education adopted regulations 
that require a similar approach across the state.279  The regulations explicitly 
“distinguish school discipline from law enforcement and prohibit the 
involvement of school resource officers in school discipline.”280  The 
regulations categorize student misbehavior into three categories.  Even the 
names of these categories reflect a line between discipline and law 
enforcement—the two less severe categories, “behavioral misconduct” and 
“disruptive conduct,” do not suggest the need for law enforcement 
involvement, in contrast to the most severe category, “criminal conduct.”281  
The regulations provide a list of allowed responses to each category of 
misbehavior and makes clear that SRO involvement is limited.  No SRO 
involvement is permitted for “behavioral misconduct.”282  At the other end 
of the spectrum, the regulations provide that “criminal conduct” “usually 
require[s] . . . the intervention of the School Resource Officer or other local 
law enforcement authorities.”283  As the phrase “criminal conduct” suggests, 
all behavior listed in that category violates the criminal law.284  Still, these 
regulations reflect the desire to prevent SROs’ involvement with misbehavior 
that could be considered criminal but is better handled by school officials.  
The regulation excludes from its list of “criminal conduct” minor offenses, 
including disturbing schools, breach of peace, disorderly conduct, and 
assaults that do not “pose a . . . serious threat to the safety of oneself or others 
in school.”285  In the middle ground, “disruptive conduct” may lead to law 
enforcement referral when “the conduct rises to a level of criminality” and 
“the conduct presents an immediate safety risk to one or more people or it is 
the third or subsequent act which rises to a level of criminality in that school 
year.”286  The essence of these regulations is to permit schools to refer 
misbehavior to SROs only when incidents create a security threat or are 
severe enough to require a law enforcement response; otherwise, SROs 
should not be involved.  Finally, schools must include all of these limitations 
 
ocr/pdfs/RCSD-SRO-ComplianceReview-08102016.pdf [https://perma.cc/MH9U-EJ9T].  
For a more detailed discussion of the voluntary agreement, see Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, 
at 136–37. 
 279. Shortly after the Spring Valley incident, the South Carolina Department of Education 
convened a Safe Schools Task Force, which recommended new regulation regarding SROs 
and revisions to an existing regulation regarding school discipline codes. See S.C. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., SOUTH CAROLINA SAFE SCHOOLS TASKFORCE REPORT 5 (2016), http://ed.sc.gov/ 
newsroom/public-information-resources/south-carolina-safe-schools-taskforce-report/ 
[https://perma.cc/7XGU-SBHR]. 
 280. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-210(V) (May 26, 2017). 
 281. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-279(IV) (May 26, 2017). 
 282. The regulation excludes an SRO or law enforcement referral from its list of 
enforcement procedures. Id. § 43-279(IV)(A)(3).  The Department proposed these regulations 
in a document with tables listing possible consequences for different levels of misconduct.  
The table for behavioral misconduct shaded in the column for “call to law enforcement,” 
indicating it is not a permitted option. See S.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 279. 
 283. See S.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 279, at 12–13. 
 284. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-279(IV)(C)(2) (May 26, 2017). 
 285. Id. § 43-279(IV)(C)(2)(a), (3). 
 286. Id. § 43-279(IV)(B)(3)(d). 
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on SRO involvement in memoranda of understanding with local law 
enforcement agencies to keep SROs out of school discipline.287 
Moreover, the South Carolina General Assembly made the line between 
law enforcement and school discipline clearer by significantly narrowing the 
scope of a criminal statute banning school disturbances.288  That statute made 
it a crime “for any person willfully or unnecessarily to interfere with or to 
disturb in any way or in any place the students or teachers of any school or 
college in this State.”289  That broad language echoed similar language in 
multiple other states, and a series of legislative, judicial, and administrative 
decisions had broadened its scope over the years, until it became commonly 
used for school misbehavior and, eventually, the second-most frequent 
charge referred to South Carolina family courts.290  It was also the charge 
filed in the Spring Valley incident.291  Now, the statute is significantly 
narrowed so it does not apply to students properly at school.292  The result is 
that most student misbehavior—such as the disobedience at issue in the 
Spring Valley incident,293 loud or rude back talk, or the burping at issue in 
A.M. v. Holmes294—is now excluded from the criminal law, which makes the 
line between SROs’ law enforcement duties and school discipline easier to 
enforce. 
C.  Ferguson, Missouri, Reforms Build a Sharper Division Between 
Law Enforcement and School Discipline 
Ferguson, Missouri, presents another leading example of school-to-prison 
pipeline reforms that prevent SRO involvement in general school discipline.  
Following the high-profile police shooting of an unarmed black man and 
ensuing mass protest, the DOJ opened a wide-ranging investigation into the 
Ferguson Police Department, which led to a series of critical findings, 
including some regarding SROs.295  The DOJ found that the Department’s 
SROs “treat[ed] routine discipline issues as criminal matters.”296  This 
problem resulted, in part, from the failure of an MOU between the police 
 
 287. 41 S.C. Reg. § 43-210(V) (May 26, 2017). 
 288. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-420 (2018). 
 289. Id. 
 290. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 102–03.  Disturbing school referrals declined 
dramatically after the Spring Valley incident, but it still ranked as the fifth most frequent 
charge statewide. Id. at 130.  For a review of how the statute gradually expanded over the 
years, see generally Kristen Coble, Note, Disturbing Schools Law in South Carolina, 69 S.C. 
L. REV. 859 (2018). 
 291. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 204, at 93. 
 292. The revised statute applies to “a person who is not a student,” defined as someone not 
enrolled at school or who is suspended or expelled from the school, and who engages in certain 
listed actions. B. 182, 122d Gen. Assemb. § 1 (S.C. 2018) (codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-
17-420 (2018)).  Threatening to kill or physically injure remains outlawed. Id. § 2 (codified at 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-425 (2018)). 
 293. See supra notes 274–78 and accompanying text. 
 294. See supra notes 237–43 and accompanying text. 
 295. See generally CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015). 
 296. Id. at 37. 
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department and local schools to “clearly define the SROs’ role or limit SRO 
involvement in cases of routine discipline or classroom management.”297  As 
a result, the Ferguson Police Department filed multiple charges against 
schoolchildren for failure to comply, peace disturbance, and similarly petty 
charges, which triggered concerns about criminalizing school discipline.  The 
DOJ investigation reported that “SROs told us that they viewed increased 
arrests in the schools as a positive result,” which indicated a “failure of 
training” and lack of appreciation for the harmful effects of criminalizing 
disciplinary infractions.298 
The remedy for these problems explicitly involved drawing sharper lines 
between law enforcement and school discipline.  The DOJ’s investigation 
included a set of recommendations, including that SROs avoid 
“unnecessarily treating disciplinary issues as criminal matters.”299  DOJ and 
city officials subsequently negotiated a detailed consent decree with various 
provisions under the heading “SRO Non-Involvement in School 
Discipline.”300  Those provisions explicitly treat SROs as providing security 
and law enforcement services separate from school disciplinary purposes.  
The core element of the consent decree is that SRO involvement is limited to 
situations posing a physical safety risk and is expressly forbidden in any 
situation that can be “safely and appropriately” handled by the school’s 
internal disciplinary team.301  The consent decree designates “minor offenses 
committed by students,” such as disorderly conduct, trespassing, “and 
fighting not involving a weapon and not resulting in physical injury,” as 
disciplinary matters that should not trigger SRO involvement.302  When 
SROs are involved for security reasons, the consent decree requires them to 
“de-escalate the situation” and then end their involvement and refer the 
matter to school officials “at the earliest opportunity.”303 
Not only does this consent decree exclude SROs from school discipline, 
but its language places SROs alongside other law enforcement officers—not 
school officials.  The consent decree refers to “SROs and other [Ferguson 
Police Department] officers” three separate times,304 language that treats 
SROs like other law enforcement officers and not like school officials. 
D.  Local Memoranda of Understanding and Other Reforms 
Limit SROs’ Role 
The elements recommended by federal proposals and present in South 
Carolina and Ferguson, Missouri, reforms are also evident in a range of local 
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 298. Id. at 38. 
 299. Id. at 94. 
 300. Consent Decree at 50, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-00180-CDP 
(E.D. Mo. Apr. 19, 2016). 
 301. Id. para. 212. 
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 304. Id. paras. 212–13, 222. 
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reforms.  They are particularly notable in local MOUs, including those which 
the DOJ listed as illustrative of good school and law enforcement 
collaborations.305  Such agreements are particularly important because of the 
consensus that schools and law enforcement agencies should enter them and 
that they “should clearly state the roles and responsibilities” of SROs and 
school officials.306  The federal government has advised that MOUs should 
distinguish SROs’ law enforcement roles from school discipline by explicitly 
providing that SROs should not be involved in the latter.307 
Denver’s 2013 agreement,308 which the DOJ cited as a model MOU,309 
provides a leading example of recent agreements that separate school 
discipline from law enforcement and limit SROs’ work to the latter.  This 
agreement followed statewide legislation that declared the harms from 
referring children to law enforcement and that “[i]nvolvement of students in 
the criminal or juvenile justice systems should be avoided when addressing 
minor misbehavior.”310  The law “encouraged” schools to consider several 
factors before referring incidents to law enforcement, including a student’s 
age, disciplinary history, and disability (if any), as well as the severity of the 
misbehavior and “[w]hether a lesser intervention would properly address” 
the situation.311  The Denver agreement put those legislative declarations into 
practice. This agreement includes some general language about how SROs 
contribute to schools’ overall learning environment;312 more specific 
provisions provide a distinct line between SROs’ core law enforcement 
duties and schools’ discipline duties.  Crucially, the agreement states that 
“the primary duty of an SRO is to handle criminal matters at the school.”313  
To enforce this rule, the agreement requires SROs to “differentiate between 
disciplinary issues and crime problems and respond appropriately.”314  The 
agreement requires SROs to “understand” that the school seeks to “minimize 
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the use of law enforcement intervention” in response to disciplinary issues.315  
This agreement followed local activism calling for SROs to “only be used for 
appropriate purposes,”316 and activists hailed Denver Public Schools’ 57 
percent reduction in its rate of referring children to law enforcement.317 
Like Colorado, Utah enacted legislation in 2016, which required local law 
enforcement agencies and school districts to develop agreements that 
distinguish school discipline from law enforcement.318  The Utah law 
requires local entities to identify “offenses that are administrative issues” and 
which SROs must leave to school administrators to handle.319  Other 
“offenses,” including “minor” criminal violations, require SROs to “confer” 
with school officials—this creates a process by which SROs and school 
officials can define the line between law enforcement and discipline.320 
The nation’s two largest school systems have adopted similar reforms.  
Officials in New York City agreed to an MOU in 1998 which explicitly 
empowered SROs to enforce school disciplinary rules in addition to criminal 
laws and “encourage[d]” school staff to “avail themselves of appropriate 
NYPD input and assistance” in enforcing school discipline.321  Fifteen years 
later, New York City schools embarked on various reforms based on the 
“recognition that non-criminal, school-based discipline matters are best 
addressed by school staff” and not by the NYPD’s School Safety Division.322  
New York officials dated these reforms to 2012 and credited them with a 
29 percent decline in arrests at school from 2012–2015.323  In 2014, the Los 
Angeles School Police Department adopted a new policy governing SRO 
response to “minor law violations” based explicitly on the federal guidance 
discussed in Part III.A.324  The Department made plain that school police 
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officers “enforce the law” and “do not respond to routine school discipline 
matters” absent a safety need.325  The policy reiterates in several ways a line 
between SROs’ law enforcement duties and schools’ broader discipline 
goals.326 
Other jurisdictions have similarly reformed the role of their SROs.  The 
MOU between law enforcement and the school district in Broward County, 
Florida, similarly states that SROs do not provide school discipline.327  To 
distinguish law enforcement from school discipline roles—and thus enforce 
that limitation on SRO roles—Broward County’s agreement created a school 
discipline matrix that defined when school officials were supposed to refer 
matters to SROs; otherwise, school officials should intervene on their 
own.328  San Francisco, California, public schools entered into an MOU in 
2013 which provided that school staff may only request assistance from 
SROs “when . . . necessary to protect the physical safety of students and 
staff,” to address a crime by a nonstudent, and when required by law—and 
“not . . . in a situation that can be safely and appropriately handled by the 
District’s internal disciplinary procedures.”329  Kentucky officials adopted a 
model MOU that emphasizes that an “SRO shall not act as a school 
disciplinarian,” a task that falls to school officials.330 
The DOJ also noted model MOUs presented by the Pennsylvania 
Department of Education, which emphasize that SROs should not provide 
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regular school discipline.331  Both example models state that SROs must not 
act as school disciplinarians.332  The Department also offered model SRO job 
descriptions that emphasize that an SRO serves in “a sworn law-enforcement 
position” and must be “[a]ble to differentiate what constitutes a crime and 
what incidents are school conduct violations.”333  Despite some general 
language suggesting that SROs serve both law enforcement and school 
discipline goals,334 more specific lists of core job functions emphasize SROs’ 
law enforcement duties and preparation for and response to emergency 
situations.335 
The Trump administration’s Federal Commission on School Safety cited 
the Montgomery County, Maryland, 2017 MOU, which provides similar 
distinctions.336  That MOU explicitly provides that SROs “will not . . . 
enforce” school district rules.337  Moreover, the MOU made clear that 
relatively minor incidents on the line between school discipline and law 
enforcement need not be reported to SROs.  Only “critical incidents” must 
be reported, defined as assaults “that require[] medical attention outside of 
the school health room,” thefts of property worth $500 or more, weapon 
possession, or possession of drugs with the intent to distribute them.338  Less 
severe offenses—most fights, petty thefts, and simple possession of drugs—
would not trigger that reporting requirement and thus could receive a school 
disciplinary response only. 
The National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO)—a 
private organization which advocates for the importance of SROs and for 
model SRO programs and trainings—also emphasizes the primacy of SROs’ 
law enforcement role.  NASRO explains that SROs are police officers who 
serve “as part of a total community-policing strategy” and spend most of their 
time “on school-safety and law-enforcement activities.”339  Their law 
enforcement expertise helps SROs investigate and respond to suspected 
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crimes and threats “larger than an isolated fight.”340  This law enforcement 
focus requires a line between SROs and school discipline; NASRO identifies 
a “best practice” for situations when an SRO identifies a school rule 
violation:  the SRO should “tak[e] the student(s) to where school discipline 
can be determined solely by school officials.”341 
School districts and law enforcement agencies’ MOUs have explicitly 
cited NASRO for the propositions that 
the SRO is first and foremost a law enforcement officer . . . .  Enforcement 
of the code of student conduct is the responsibility of teachers and 
administrators.  The SRO shall refrain from being involved in the 
enforcement of disciplinary rules that do not constitute violations of law, 
except to support staff in maintaining a safe school environment.342 
The examples described in this section are not exhaustive.  A “growing 
number” of MOUs contain similar limitations and school districts’ codes of 
conduct “increasingly” include provisions that call on school staff to refer 
matters to SROs only when the seriousness of the act, prior violations, and 
the student’s age and grade make it appropriate.343 
IV.  RECONSIDERING SCHOOL-SEARCH STANDARDS IN AN AGE OF REFORM 
In the 1990s and 2000s, Dilworth and other cases applying the majority 
rule drew a line between SROs and outside police officers for Fourth 
Amendment purposes.344  The reforms described in Part III occurred in the 
2010s and drew the line at a different spot—between SROs, who focus on 
law enforcement, and school officials, who manage school discipline.  Where 
Dilworth described an SRO with power to impose school discipline on 
students and other cases described SROs as obliged to cooperate with school 
officials, these reforms limit SROs to law enforcement roles and direct them 
to not intervene in routine school disciplinary matters.345 
Applying the Fourth Amendment principles discussed in Part I to this new 
line requires reevaluating the majority rule.  This new distinction (in 
jurisdictions governed by such reforms) aligns with what critics have 
argued—SROs are law enforcement officers, and Fourth Amendment 
doctrine should treat them as such.  Especially in jurisdictions that have 
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engaged in reforms along the lines described in Part III, a search involving 
an SRO is now unmistakably a search entangled with law enforcement 
purposes and thus cannot seriously be considered a search serving a “special 
need[], beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”346 
This Part makes that doctrinal argument in two settings—first, in the 
relatively easy case when SROs are directly involved in conducting a search, 
and, second, in the more difficult case in which SROs are not involved in a 
search itself but by contractual agreement or other force of law, school 
officials must turn over evidence of crimes from such searches to SROs.  In 
both categories, reforms that emphasize SROs’ law enforcement, and not 
school discipline, roles support the conclusion that T.L.O. does not generally 
apply to SROs. 
A.  Applying the Supreme Court’s Principles Leads to T.L.O.’s 
Inapplicability to SRO-Involved Searches 
T.L.O.’s holding that school officials can generally search students with 
only reasonable suspicion—and without probable cause or a warrant—
depends on the unique needs of school discipline and the relationships 
between educators and students.347  In reform jurisdictions, SROs’ focus is 
now more clearly on law enforcement, not school discipline.  SROs therefore 
do not need “a certain degree of flexibility” because that flexibility belongs 
“in school disciplinary procedures.”348  Nor do they need a Fourth 
Amendment standard that lets them implement “swift and informal 
disciplinary procedures.”349  State courts applying the minority rule 
emphasized facts that showed a now more common line between law 
enforcement and discipline, such as an informal agreement between an SRO 
and a principal to follow such a line or the absence of authority in an SRO to 
impose any school discipline.350 
The argument is not that SROs will operate like all other police officers, 
but that SROs’ jobs distinguish them from the school disciplinary purposes 
that provide the foundation of T.L.O.’s reduced Fourth Amendment standard.  
In addition to enforcing the law in response to relatively serious crimes 
committed at school, SROs will continue to work to prevent crimes by 
working to keep children from joining gangs, educating children about the 
law, and even mentoring children.351  Like other community-policing tasks, 
those activities serve crime-prevention goals that do not distinguish SROs for 
Fourth Amendment purposes.  Rather than those tasks, it was work as a 
member of a school team imposing school discipline that state courts found 
justified applying T.L.O. to SRO-involved searches.352  Thus, it is reforms 
 
 346. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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that prevent SROs from engaging in routine school discipline that requires 
reevaluating such decisions. 
Moreover, knowing that SROs will not engage in routine disciplinary 
incidents necessarily communicates to students that an SRO’s involvement 
changes the character of any interaction involving a search that does occur 
between students and SROs.  Where teachers and other school officials see 
children in class and at lunch and must respond to the multitude of major and 
minor disruptions each day caused by juvenile behavior, SROs are called in 
only in narrower situations.  In such situations, the SRO’s mere presence 
communicates to students that the incident is no longer between the student 
and the school but is now a matter for law enforcement.353  That clarity makes 
it less likely that SROs can develop the “close association” that Justice 
Powell saw between educators and students and frames those interactions 
“adversar[ially]” as any other interaction between police and criminal 
suspects.354 
Justice Blackmun’s T.L.O. concurrence—whose language forms the basis 
of later Supreme Court cases—even more directly leads to this conclusion.  
T.L.O. only applies when “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement,” so require.355  When an SRO, who state and local policy define 
as a law enforcement official and who may only become involved in searches 
or seizures related to criminal law enforcement situations, gets involved, the 
situation has crossed the line from special need to law enforcement. 
Litigation in Tennessee from the early part of the present reform era 
follows the model of this argument.  The Tennessee Supreme Court held that 
the standard that properly applies to an SRO depends on whether SROs more 
closely resemble law enforcement officers or school officials, but it did not 
decide which standard should apply in the case before it, instead remanding 
for further factual development.356  On remand, an intermediate appellate 
court held in an unpublished opinion that the SRO was a law enforcement 
officer and therefore needed probable cause before conducting the search at 
issue.357  The court began by reviewing the relevant MOU, which specified 
that the SRO will not serve as a school disciplinarian—a school 
responsibility—and described the SRO’s role in multiple places as relating 
to law enforcement duties.358  In addition, the SRO worked for the local law 
enforcement agency, wore a uniform at the school, was armed, drove to 
school in a marked police car, participated in a range of law enforcement 
activities, and was perceived by others at the school as a law enforcement 
officer.359 
 
 353. See Holland, supra note 142, at 77–78 (describing how SROs’ role shapes the nature 
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 354. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348–49 (Powell, J., concurring). 
 355. Id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 356. R.D.S. v. State, 245 S.W.3d 356, 370 (Tenn. 2008). 
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App. 2009). 
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Applying this approach should lead to the same result in jurisdictions that 
have adopted the reforms discussed in Part III, or similar reforms.  There, 
state and local authorities have drawn a line between school officials and 
SROs.  The former are in charge of school discipline—the special need that 
justifies the exception from the warrant and probable cause requirements 
under T.L.O.  The latter have law enforcement purposes, and they do not 
work toward the special need identified in T.L.O. 
Applying this standard will necessarily involve close analysis of SROs’ 
function in both policy and practice, a point which may vary from one school 
district to another.  State and local laws, local MOUs, and local policies and 
practices all will bear significantly on the analysis.  A jurisdiction that rejects 
the reforms described in Part III could convincingly show that nothing there 
has changed since the majority rule following Dilworth was cemented in the 
1990s and early 2000s.360 
Notably, NASRO agrees with this general approach.  When SROs respond 
to incidents directly, they “engage[] in routine law-enforcement activities 
indistinguishable from duties performed off campus” and “[s]tandard Fourth 
Amendment requirements govern.”361  But NASRO seeks to limit this 
conclusion, citing the Tennessee case discussed above362 to caution local 
governments to not enter a “flawed MOU” that could deny SROs the ability 
to use T.L.O.363  Putting aside the policy wisdom of that position,364 it is 
difficult to see how a state or local jurisdiction can keep SROs focused on 
law enforcement and not school discipline without creating the implication 
that SROs should not qualify for the T.L.O. standard when they are involved 
in conducting searches. 
NASRO does not, however, extend this position to searches led by school 
officials that involve SROs.  NASRO asserts that when assisting an educator 
in a search that the educator initiates, the SRO is acting in “educator-support 
mode” and T.L.O. applies.365  The reforms described in Part III, however, 
make it hard to endorse the notion that an “educator-support mode” should 
trump an SRO’s law enforcement roles.  Calling in an SRO is fully 
appropriate when the situation requires law enforcement.  And it comes with 
consequences—both to the individual suspected of wrongdoing, who may be 
arrested by that officer, and to the Fourth Amendment standard.  That is, the 
line between law enforcement and school discipline—a line NASRO itself 
endorses—means that involving SROs changes the character of the school 
officials’ search. 
 
 360. Such a jurisdiction would still be vulnerable to the doctrinal critiques discussed in Part 
I.D and the policy critiques discussed in Part II.B. 
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B.  Reforms Also Render T.L.O. Inapplicable to Searches by School 
Officials Under Policies Requiring Referrals to Law Enforcement 
The more difficult question is whether and how recent reforms affect 
Fourth Amendment standards for searches by school officials who, pursuant 
to state and local policies, turn over the fruits of those searches to SROs.  This 
question is particularly important because school officials can, under T.L.O., 
conduct many searches of students without having probable cause or a 
warrant, and courts have generally approved such searches even when, by 
policy or interagency agreement, the fruits of such searches are turned over 
to law enforcement.366 
Moreover, following this Article’s argument would create an incentive for 
school officials to conduct even more searches because they could arguably 
take advantage of T.L.O. while SROs could not.  Indeed, in jurisdictions that 
have followed the minority rule and held SROs to a higher Fourth 
Amendment standard, the precise result has been “a system in which [school] 
administrators are conducting most searches and questioning youth” and then 
turning over evidence of crimes to law enforcement.367  School 
administrators take advantage of the T.L.O. standard to search a broader set 
of students than SROs could, with SROs likely engaging in willful 
blindness—keeping themselves away from school administrator searches so 
they do not taint administrators’ ability to search with the lower standard, and 
knowing that they can receive the fruits of such searches.368 
Courts have noted this dynamic and offered disapproving language,369 but 
they do not always act on that disapproval.  One Colorado case, In re 
P.E.A.,370 presented a particularly clear example of a police officer seeking 
to evade Fourth Amendment requirements by prompting school officials to 
conduct a search.  There, a regular police officer (not even an SRO) received 
a tip that several children were involved in selling marijuana at a local school, 
and the officer, who did not have probable cause to arrest the children, 
informed the school of the tip “with the intent to instigate an investigation by 
school officials.”371  An investigation ensued, and the Colorado Supreme 
Court deemed the school officials’ subsequent search of one of the suspect’s 
cars to be a school search under T.L.O. because, the court reasoned, no 
agency relationship existed between the police officer and school officials.372  
In another case, a New Hampshire appellate court ruled for a defendant when 
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an SRO who lacked probable cause referred an investigation to school 
officials who, pursuant to a “silent understanding,” would conduct the 
investigation and share any contraband with the officer373—a more 
principled analysis than the Colorado case. 
Such searches—both when school officials act following information 
provided by law enforcement and when school officials search for evidence 
of a crime and turn over such evidence pursuant to an agreement with law 
enforcement—should not qualify for T.L.O.’s standard for multiple reasons.  
First, T.L.O.’s standard seeks to help school officials maintain school 
discipline, not to help police officers escape Fourth Amendment limits by 
inducing school officials to conduct law enforcement investigations.  More 
generally, such searches are too intertwined with law enforcement to qualify 
as special needs searches.  This argument rests heavily on Ferguson v. City 
of Charleston and other special needs cases discussed in Part I.D.  Those 
cases establish that the question is not whether school officials have become 
agents of law enforcement, as the Colorado Supreme Court asked in In re 
P.E.A., but whether the relationship between schools and law enforcement 
makes it impossible to disentangle school disciplinary special needs from the 
normal need for criminal law enforcement.  When a school official suspects 
a child possesses a small amount of marijuana374 and searches the child under 
a policy and MOU that requires the official to refer any evidence of any 
illegal drug use to the SRO, then that search looks a lot like the hospital urine 
screens turned over to law enforcement in Ferguson.  Such policies have long 
been commonplace,375 and the reforms discussed in Part III do not change 
those reporting policies. 
The clearer demarcation between school discipline and law enforcement 
that is the hallmark of reforms discussed in Part III helps demonstrate these 
searches’ law enforcement purposes.376  School-to-prison pipeline reforms 
create a sharp line between SROs and other law enforcement and school 
discipline.  MOUs that simultaneously draw that sharp line and direct school 
officials to cross that line by reporting evidence of certain crimes to law 
enforcement transform these searches from a school-discipline search to a 
law enforcement search.  Otherwise, there is little reason to involve the SRO, 
and whatever action the school official is taking is no longer pursuing a 
“special need[], beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”377  That was 
precisely the Supreme Court’s holding in Ferguson—that an agreement 
requiring non-law-enforcement officials to turn evidence of a crime over to 
police renders T.L.O.’s special needs test inapplicable.378 
 
 373. State v. Heirtzler, 789 A.2d 634, 637 (N.H. 2001). 
 374. If a school official searches a child based on suspicion of only a school rule violation 
and discovers evidence of a crime, that is a different matter.  The purpose of the search itself 
is what determines whether the special needs doctrine applies. 
 375. See Kagan, supra note 144, at 307–10. 
 376. See supra Part III. 
 377. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
 378. See supra notes 152–73 and accompanying text. 
2019] REEVALUATING SCHOOL SEARCHES 2063 
This scenario should make for an easier case than the New Hampshire case 
involving a “silent understanding” between the SRO and school officials.379  
There, the trial court had to determine if school officials searched a student 
at an SRO’s behest and whether this amounted to “‘a mere wink or nod’ or 
something more concrete.”380  Clear policies that require school officials to 
turn over evidence of crimes to SROs provides concrete proof of law 
enforcement entanglement.  In such situations, the state cannot justify a claim 
that the school officials acted only in furtherance of school discipline; they 
have “agree[d]”—via the agreements or policies at issue—“to take on the 
mantle of criminal investigation and enforcement,” and so must follow 
search and seizure standards applicable to law enforcement.381 
C.  Policy Benefits of a Doctrinal Shift:  Incentives to Limit 
the School-to-Prison Pipeline 
Excluding school searches entangled with law enforcement from the 
T.L.O. rule serves important policy purposes that help respond to the 
concerns about the school-to-prison pipeline discussed in Part II.  Consistent 
with prevailing criticisms of the school-to-prison pipeline, this exclusion 
recognizes that the consequences of searches matter and that the 
consequences of turning relatively minor misdeeds into law enforcement 
matters are often harmful to children. 
This Article’s proposed rule forces school districts to make a choice—if 
they wish to maintain the freedom to search students without a warrant or 
probable cause, then they must choose how to keep such searches focused on 
school discipline and their subjects out of the juvenile and criminal justice 
systems.  They could choose, like the school districts in Acton and Earls, to 
search students but avoid referring the results of such searches to law 
enforcement.382  If there are situations so serious that law enforcement 
involvement is desired, then schools should surrender use of the T.L.O. 
exception; having made the choice to refer a category of situations to law 
enforcement, there should be no pretending that resulting searches only serve 
school disciplinary goals. 
This policy choice is consistent with post-T.L.O. cases’ focus on the 
“programmatic” purposes of searches.383  That focus imposes Fourth 
Amendment consequences on policymakers’ deliberate programmatic or 
policy choices, and those consequences provide some incentives to limit the 
most coercive powers of government control over individuals.  It places a 
modest weight on the scale in favor of a less law-enforcement-heavy 
response, which, especially in the school setting, would be a good result for 
all of the reasons discussed in Part II.B.  More modest and practical benefits 
of forcing such policy choices exist too—a state or local policy describing 
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when SROs may search students and when school officials may do so and 
refer the evidence to law enforcement would likely impose some modest 
limits on such searches and thus balance their value with the harms of law 
enforcement referrals and the privacy invasions of such searches.384 
V.  WHAT ABOUT SCHOOL SHOOTINGS?:  A CALL FOR A SCHOOL-SPECIFIC 
STANDARD FOR TERRY SEARCHES RATHER THAN ANY SEARCH 
While schools remain generally safe locations for children,385 any effort 
to make it more difficult to search students will undoubtedly raise concerns 
of undermining authorities’ ability to protect schoolchildren from mass 
shootings and other gun violence.  Indeed, I started writing this Article in the 
aftermath of the February 2018 school shooting in Parkland, Florida, and 
continued work during the Santa Fe, Texas, school shooting in May 2018, 
and it is reasonable to fear that further mass shootings may occur at one or 
more schools by the time it reaches publication.  Moreover, less high-profile 
school shootings occur on a more frequent basis.386  While it is easy to 
exaggerate the threats to children at school, it is widely accepted that any 
shootings and the threat or fear of such shootings in schools is unacceptable. 
This Part outlines a response to these concerns:  When authorities suspect 
the potential of deadly violence at school, then courts can craft a doctrinal 
path to permit limited searches to serve that goal.  Doing so would rely on a 
narrower doctrine than applying T.L.O. to all SRO-involved searches and 
thus would limit the risk that such doctrine would trigger the school-to-prison 
pipeline concerns described in Part II.B. 
When faced with suspicions that a student may have brought a weapon to 
school—from, for instance, a tip from another student—but unsure whether 
grounds for a warrant exist, what should school officials or SROs do?  Their 
evidence may not provide probable cause, but the suspicion is of the utmost 
seriousness.  The analytically easy first step is that authorities—school 
officials or law enforcement—should investigate more.  An investigation 
may clarify that there is no threat or provide probable cause that a particular 
child has a weapon in a particular location, supporting a warrant to search 
that location387 or, depending on the details, that there no warrant is required 
due to exigent circumstances.  Less powerful evidence might establish 
reasonable suspicion that a child has a dangerous weapon on his person, 
which would justify a limited Terry search for that weapon.388 
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Terry is one appropriate vehicle for such searches because it was intended 
to allow protective searches in response to the unique threat from firearms 
and the “extraordinary dangers” they can present.389  It applies, of course, to 
law enforcement, and thus it applies to SROs even after they are properly 
recognized as law enforcement officers rather than school officials. 
Even so, there may be some situations which do not satisfy even the lower 
standard of Terry and yet call for some kind of measures to ensure safety.  As 
the Florida Court of Appeals wrote in 2011, “Allegations of gun possession 
on school campuses are different from traditional Fourth Amendment 
cases . . . because of the seriousness of the threat, the location of the threat, 
[and] the vulnerability and number of potential victims . . . .”390  The Court 
has suggested such an approach in Florida v. J.L.391—“extraordinary dangers 
sometimes justify unusual precautions.”392  In J.L., the Court held that a 
search on a public street could not meet the standards for a Terry stop but 
suggested that the same facts at a school could support “protective searches 
on the basis of information insufficient to justify searches elsewhere.”393  
Where J.L. suggested something less than reasonable suspicion of a firearm 
might support protective searches at schools, the Fourth Circuit held that the 
“dire” implications of a firearm at a school justified an expanded scope of 
searches and seizures permitted by Terry.394  The court upheld the detention 
a student suspected of bringing a gun to school in the principal’s office until 
school and law enforcement authorities had determined no such gun was 
present.395  In such circumstances, warrantless searches based only on 
reasonable suspicion would be justified. 
That analysis is untouched by the argument in this Article.  Unlike the 
broader school-search framework, an emergency school search does not 
depend on either a purely school disciplinary purpose or the role of SROs.  
The J.L Court’s suggestion is based on the particular vulnerability of schools 
to violence, the extreme dangers posed by firearms (or other weapons capable 
of killing or injuring many individuals in short periods of time), and the 
state’s special obligation to protect schoolchildren from such harm.  This 
flexible Terry analysis is particularly appropriate in school searches for 
firearms because a school “is a special kind of place in which serious and 
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dangerous wrongdoing is intolerable,” which weighs in favor of searches 
narrowly intended to prevent such dangerous events.396 
In such cases, the immediacy and severity of the threat justify a search, 
even with later law enforcement consequences.  The same cannot be said for 
a student suspected of possessing a small amount of marijuana.  The best way 
doctrinally to distinguish the two is to follow the rules for Terry stops within 
schools.  Then, when a weapon is suspected, a lesser standard than probable 
cause is required and, as the Court suggested in J.L., when particularly 
serious and immediate dangers are suspected, courts could permit a broader 
range of Terry searches than would be permissible in other public places.  
These searches would be limited “in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place”397—it would justify a search for 
a deadly weapon, but not a more invasive search.  As importantly, it would 
not justify searches for less immediate dangers. 
One case illustrates how this doctrinal shift would preserve authorities’ 
ability to protect schools without contributing so significantly to the school-
to-prison pipeline.  In re Ana E.398 involved a child who got into a fight with 
another child, remained agitated after the fight, and threatened to “make the 
other student bleed.”399  When a school official retrieved the student’s 
backpack from a classroom, other students were reluctant to give it to her and 
one said she should not search it.400  School officials suspected that the bag 
contained a weapon and were particularly concerned that, given the student’s 
agitation and threat to the child with whom she had just fought, she might 
use any such weapon.  For all the reasons explained in this Article, other 
courts should not follow the Ana E. court’s blanket holding that reasonable 
suspicion applies to any search of a student conducted by an SRO.  But Terry 
would justify seizing the backpack given the immediacy and severity of the 
safety risk at issue. 
Applying Terry (with J.L.’s gloss) but not T.L.O. both enables police to 
prevent the immediate risk of severe violence while ensuring searches are 
related to the specific risk, not to a broader and more amorphous concern 
about school discipline.  It thus provides a more focused doctrinal path to 
keep schools safe from severe violence while mitigating the risk of 
broadening the school-to-prison pipeline.  That is far more focused than 
giving SROs or school officials working closely with them carte blanche to 
search for evidence of a wide range of minor offenses. 
CONCLUSION 
The present decade has seen many promising reforms of the school-to-
prison pipeline, especially reforms to keep SROs out of school discipline and 
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thus reduce the number of incidents in which law enforcement involvement 
can transform school disciplinary matters into delinquency cases.  Other 
elements of the pipeline remain in need of reform, including the rule applied 
in a majority of states permitting SROs to use reduced Fourth Amendment 
standards to search students at school. 
Most state courts have upheld school searches entangled with law 
enforcement based on a particular understanding of SROs’ roles.  In Fourth 
Amendment cases, courts conceived of SROs as either entirely equivalent to 
school officials or as functionally equivalent—that when they were involved 
in searches, it was to assist school officials and, implicitly, their involvement 
did not change the character of the search and justified application of T.L.O.’s 
relaxed search standard.  This analysis drew a line between SROs and other 
law enforcement officers based on the idea that SROs’ unique duties and 
collaboration with school officials made their searches more like school 
officials’ searches than law enforcement searches.  This line ignored the law 
enforcement consequences that flowed from such searches, but it did reflect 
the reality that SROs acted for both school disciplinary and law enforcement 
purposes.  That reality was reflected in rules empowering SROs to impose 
school disciplinary consequences and policies and practices permitting SROs 
to become involved in school disciplinary matters. 
More recent reforms have drawn a new line between school officials and 
SROs.  The former are the primary actors responsible for a school’s learning 
environment and school discipline, with a range of authorities limiting when 
SROs can become involved.  SRO involvement is limited to more traditional 
police action—to enforce criminal laws and respond to incidents that threaten 
the immediate safety of one or more people (incidents that often, if not 
usually, involve some kind of criminal law violation).  Where this new line 
exists—it is well developed in some jurisdictions, and emerging in others—
it requires a reevaluation of Fourth Amendment law.  This line shows that 
courts can no longer rationally see SROs as school officials, and it shows that 
involving SROs transforms an investigation from school discipline to law 
enforcement.  This line clarifies that the programmatic purpose of SRO-
involved searches is to enforce criminal law and that normal Fourth 
Amendment standards governing law enforcement must apply. 
